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ABSTRACT 
Parliamentary privilege is in need of reform. Its nature is discretionary, 
arcane, complex, and does not square with modem conceptions of justice. 
Members ' absolute immunity from suit for things said in the course of 
parliamentary proceedings leaves non-members without an enforceable 
remedy for any damage their reputations might suffer from a Member's free 
speech salvo. Parliament' s punitive powers may be exercised at its own 
discretion in a context that removes an enforceable right to natural justice for 
an accused. Parliament may imprison, a role properly the domain of the court 
and the unresolved tension between court and parliament does little to provide 
hope to ordinary citizens that they can receive a fair deal from the House. 
Reform is a necessary step in bringing New Zealand 's parliament into the 21 st 
century: that change must come in the form of codification. 
The text of this paper comprises approximately 15768 words 
u 
I INTRODUCTION 
There are few areas of the law as uncertain , discretionary, and 
dangerous as the law of parliamentary privilege. It does not 
conform to the proper principles that should govern modem law. 
While changes have been made, they fall short of making the law 
of parliamentary privilege satisfactory. 1 
New Zealand's parliament is "the key institution of democratic 
accountability".2 Concomitant with Parliament's status 1s the 
requirement for special privileges, known collectively as 
"parliamentary privilege". Parliamentary privilege refers to "the sum 
of the peculiar rights enjoyed by [the House of Representatives] 
without which [it] could not discharge [its] functions, and which 
exceed those possessed by other bodies or individuals".3 To that end, 
parliamentary p1ivilege affords legal protection "to members of a 
parliament and other participants in parliamentary proceedings".4 The 
principle that informs the breadth of those protections turns on whether 
or not the rule or privilege in question is necessary for Parliament "to 
1 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power (4 ed, OUP, Melbourne, 
2004) 180. The law and practice of Parliamentary privilege, including its refo1111, 
is comprehensively traversed in the following sources: Palmer and Palmer, above; 
Enid Campbell Parliamentary P1ivilege (The Federation Press, Annandale, NSW, 
2004); Senate Committee of Privileges Parliamentary Privilege: Precedents, 
Procedures, and Practice in the Australian Senate 1966-2002 (August 2002) 
I 07/2002; Philip Joseph Constitutional Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2001); Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege First Report (HL 
43; HC 214, 1998-99) ["Joint Committee (UK)"]; Donald Limon and W McKay 
(eds) Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice (22 ed, London, Butterworths, 1997); 
Law Commission The Law of Parliamentary Privilege in New Zealand (NZLC 
MPS, Wellington, 1996); David McGee Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand 
(2 ed GP Publications, Wellington, 1994); Report of the Standing Orders 
Committee On the Law of Privilege and Related Matters AJHR 1989 I I 8 B; Joint 
Select Committee of the Commonwealth Parliament Final Report (PP 219/1984) 
["Joint Select Committee (Cth)"; Charle Littlejohn Parliamentary Privilege in 
New Zealand (LLM Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, I 969). 
2 Richard Mulgan Politics in New Zealand (3 ed, Auckland University Press, 2004) 
99. 
3 Limon and McKay, above n I, 65; Law Commission, above n I, 5; Joseph, above n 
I, 386. 
4 Campbell,abovenl, I. 
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discharge its functions as a legislature effectively'} the argument 
being that "[ w ]ithout this protection members would be handicapped 
in performing their parliamentary duties, and the authority of 
Parliament itself in confronting the executive and as a forum for 
expressmg the anxieties of citizens would be correspondingly 
diminished". 6 Parliament is also primarily responsible for ensuring its 
effective operation is protected through the imposition of sanctions,7 
including powers to admonish, imprison and fine. 8 Those punitive 
powers anse in response to contempt of Parliament itself, or as a 
consequence of a breach of its privileges - "[i]f non-members 
improperly interfere with Parliament or its members or officers in 
discharging their public duties, Parliament for its own protection must 
have power to take appropriate action in response".9 
It has been said of privilege in particular that it is: "exceptional, 
peculiar, and discretionary"; 10 ''uncertain, discretionary, and 
dangerous"; 11 "an exemption from the general law"; 12 and "is, in its 
detail, a complex, technical and somewhat arcane subject". 13 
It has also been observed that: 14 
Parliament has the capacity to cause substantial injustice to 
individuals. They have no redress . The time has come to engage 
in further reform of Parliament and limit the capacity of Parliament 
to act as an engine of oppression. 
5 McGee, above n l, 468. 
6 Joint Committee, above n I , para 3-4. 
7 111isjurisdiction is not wholly exclusive: Crimes Act 1961 , s 315(1). See generally 
Philip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand 
(Butterworths, Wellington , 1993) 353. 
8 There is doubt as to whether Parliament is competent to fine: Limon and McKay, 
aboven I, 138;Joseph,aboven 1, 437-9. 
9 Joint Committee, above n I, para 262. 
'
0 0 Hood Phillips Constitutional and Administrative Law (4 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1967) 168. 
11 Palmer and Palmer, above n I, 180. 
12 Limon and McKay, above n I, 65. 
13 Joint Committee, above n I, para 11. 
14 Geoffrey Palmer "Parliament and privilege: Whose justice?" [ I 994) NZLJ 325. 
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It has been further argued that "the failure to engage in reforn1 has the 
consequence that New Zealanders will continue to suffer from the 
hands of their own Parliament". 15 Linked to that concern is whether 
Parliament should be the sole repository of adjudication on matters 
affecting its functions and impinging on its privileges. 16 Among the 
issues that arise from this concern are those relating to natural justice, 
the exercise of punitive power by a governmental branch other than the 
courts, whether or not a distinction should be drawn between strangers 
and members and the shape and content of any reform measures. 
In identifying those and other issues, the United Kingdom Joint 
Committee of the House of Lords and House of Commons on 
Parliamentary Privilege ("the Joint Committee") proclaimed in its First 
Report that, 17 
It is in the interests of the nation as a whole that the two Houses of 
Parliament should have the rights and immunities they need in 
order to function properly. But the protection afforded by privilege 
should be no more than Parliament needs to caITy out its functions 
effectively and safeguard its constitutional position. Appropriate 
procedures should exist to prevent abuse and ensure faimes . Thus 
the thread running through this report involves matching 
parliamentary privilege to the cun·ent requirements of Parliament 
and present-day standards of fairness and reasonableness. 
Eminent Australian academic, Enid Campbell has also observed that 
"parliamentarians and judges must be sensitive to a need not to extend 
parliamentary privileges beyond those which can be demonstrated to 
be vital to the carrying out of the constitutional functions of 
parliamentary institutions". 18 It is of some comfort therefore that 
following review of the Standing Orders of the House of 
15 Palmer, above n 14,325. 
16 Campbell, above n l, 6. 
17 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 32 (emphasis added). For commentary on 
the Joint Committee's Report, see Patricia Leopold "Report of the Joint 
Committee on Parliamentary Privilege" ( 1999) PL 604. 
18 Campbell, above n I, 180. 
3 
Representatives in 1995 and again in 2003, 19 substantial and positive 
changes were effected in order to allay fears that Parliament was 
somehow exempt from society's reasonable expectations of justice and 
faimess. 20 
This paper argues that in the light of serious issues arising in 
relation to the court-parliament relationship, the absolute immunity 
arsing from things said in parliamentary debates and proceedings, and 
parliament's latent punitive powers, codification remains an important 
and necessary step in bringing Parliament into the 21 st century. This 
paper, therefore, identifies three key areas for refonn that will ensure 
parliament's privileges and processes accord with reasonable 
expectations of justice, namely: addressing an unresolved tension 
between parliament and the courts as to the proper forum for the 
administration of parliamentary privilege (Part III); reform of 
strangers' right of reply to their naming in the House under Members' 
freedom of speech (Part IV); and providing an enforceable right to 
natural justice before the House (Part V). That step must, however, 
overcome two significant hurdles discussed in Part VI. Firstly, 
contemporary debate in the House mitigates any momentum for 
reform, with many members emphasising the sovereign and supreme 
role of Parliament, including the exclusive power to regulate its own 
d
. ?J procee mgs.- Secondly, Members' (and perhaps the electorate's) 
apathy is reflected in the fact that parliamentary privilege reform, and 
in particular codification reform, has been on and off the political and 
legislative agenda for twenty years (and in the academic literature for 
19 Standing Orders Committee Report on the Review of Standing Orders [ 1995] 
AJT-lR I 18A; Standing Orders of the House of Representatives (2003); Office of 
the House of Representatives Natural Justice before Select Committees: A Guide 
for Witnesses (Parliament House, Wellington, 2000); See also Clerk of the House 
of Representatives Review of Standing Orders (Parliament House, Wellington, 
2003). 
20 Principally in the fo1m of SO 232-238, 393. 
2 1 Hon Dr Michael Cullen MP (24 May 2004) NZPD 13191-2. 
more than thirty),22 yet with no progress. Before turning to those 
issues, it is helpful first to traverse the nature and sources of 
parliament's privileges in New Zealand. 
II PARLIAMENT'S 
NATURE 
"PRIVILEGES": SOURCES AND 
The legal parameters of parliamentary privilege are established 
by a combination of statute and common law,23 and in accordance with 
the customs and practices of Parliament itself. 24 This legal and 
customary scheme ensures that the House of Representatives "conducts 
its proceedings without interference by the Crown, the courts, or 
bodies outside of parliament".25 Common law sources have typically 
concerned jurisdictional issues,26 which have centred primarily on 
whether the Courts or Parliament reserve the right to determine the 
existence, nature, scope, and application of parliamentary privileges. 
The primary legislative sources in New Zealand are the Legislature Act 
1908 and the Bill of Rights 1688 (Imp). 
Section 242 of the Legislature Act 1908 provides that, 
The [New Zealand] House of Representatives . . . and the 
Committees and members thereof ... shall hold, enjoy, and exercise 
such and the like privileges, immunities and powers as on the I st day 
of January 1865 were held, enjoyed, and exercised by the House of 
Commons of Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland 
The vast majority of Parliament's privileges and powers arise under 
section 242, which is sourced from the Parliamentary Privileges Act 
1865.27 Included is the wide array of privileges that are admitted 
22 Littlejohn, above n 1. 
23 Campbell, above n I, 2; Law Commission, above n I, 5-6. 
24 See generally Limon and McKay, above n I, 67-82. 
25 Palmer and Palmer, above n I, 175. 
26 See below Part Ill A An Historical Ordeal with Contemporary Relevance. 
27 Law Commission, above n I, 7; Joseph, above n I, 388-390. 
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through section 24228 are those of present interest, namely 
Parliament's power to punish for contempt,29 and Parliament's power 
to regulate and be the sole judge in its own proceedings. 30 The nature 
and characteristics of the privileges arising under section 242 are a 
matter for the Court, but the application of privileges is a matter for 
Parliament. 31 That dichotomy in approach creates problems for 
persons subject to the exercise of Parliament's punitive powers. On 
the one hand the Court will entertain detem1ining the scope and basis 
of a privilege, but when called upon to adjudicate over Parliament's 
application of those privileges, the Court may decline to intervene.32 
The dichotomy, therefore, presents an unjustifiable lacuna in the law, 
which has traditionally been viewed as a justification sounding in 
constitutional necessity.33 It is submitted that such justifications no 
longer withstand close scrutiny and is an important reform issue.34 
Perhaps the most important of parliament's privileges arises 
under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 (Imp), which provides that 
"the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in Parliament, 
ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of 
Parliament".35 Much academic and judicial discussion has centred 
around this statutory provision, with specific focus on the meaning to 
28 Limon and McKay, above n l , 65-8 I, I 00-107. 
29 Joseph, above n I, 391; McGee, above n I, 506. 
30 Joseph , above n I, 417. 
31 Stockdale v Hansard ( 1839) 9 Ad & E I. However, it has been noted that the 
House of Commons (and therefore the New Zealand Parliament) has never wholly 
acquiesced to the view that Parliament does not have sole jurisdiction to determine 
its privileges: Joseph , above n I, 393. This issue is discussed in more detail 
below: Part Ill A An Historical Ordeal with Contemporary Re levance . 
32 Paty 's Case ( 1704) 92 ER 232. 
33 Prebble v TVNZ [1994] 3 NZLR I, 7 (PC) Lord Brown-Wilkinson di scussed in 
Joseph , above n I, 413-414. 
34 Considered in more detail in Part Ill, below. Note here that the Joint Committee 
on Parliamentary Privilege in the United Kingdom has conceded this point: Joint 
Committee (UK), above n l , para 306. 
35 Bill of Rights 1688, Article 9 is New Zealand law by virtue of the Imperial Laws 
Application Act 1988, s 3(1) and 1st Sch. 
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be attributed to "freedom of speech" and "proceedings in Parliament" 
and "ought not to be impeached or questioned".36 
Article 9 is important because "[f]or Parliament to make 
informed decisions it is essential that its members be able to speak 
without fear of the consequences".37 The democratic imperative of 
free speech in Parliament is necessary because "[i]f you are going to 
have a democracy, discussion has to be free, uninhibited, robust and 
wide-open". 38 To that end, speech in debates and other proceedings in 
Parliament are absolutely privileged. But do the justifications for 
absolute privilege also justify the wholesale casting of, unsupported, 
spurious, or even malicious aspersions on members or non-members 
without any ability for the target of that "abuse" to mount any defence 
or vindicate their rights to present the other side? The difficulty with 
Article 9 is that it at once provides an immensely important 
constitutional function in the form of uninhibited debate, 39 whilst at 
the same time opening the door to potentially serious damage to 
innocent citizens' reputations by the very institution that ought to be 
acting in the best interests of those citizens.40 Whether or not the 
appropriate balance is struck between Parliament's need for 
uninhibited debate and citizens' rights to be treated fairly by its 
lawmaking governors is a major refom1 issue.4 1 
Parliament's privileges are not only concerned with immunity 
from suit.42 The privileges are also in the nature of powers. Those 
36 See generally Joseph , above n I, Ch 12; New Zealand Law Commission, above n 
l. 
37 Auckland District Law Society (NZ) Public Issues Committee " Parliamentary 
Privilege : Progress or Regress?" (The Committee, Auckland District Law Society, 
Auckland, 1995), 3. 
38 Geoffrey Palmer Constitutional Conversations: Geoffrey Palmer talk~ to Kim Hill 
1994-200 I (Victoria University Press, Wellington , 2002) 173. 
39 Prebble v TVNZ, above n 33, 10 (PC) Lord Brown-Wilkinson. 
40 Auckland District Law Society, above n 37, 3. 
4 1 See Part IV C Regulating Freedom of Speech. 
42 Other immunities, with which this paper is not directly concerned, include freedom 
from civ il arrest and summons, freedom of access to the Queen, favourable 
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powers emanate from the principle that "Parliament must be able to 
consider any matter it chooses and, principally through its committees, 
investigate any matter".43 Parliament has the power to call for 
witnesses and documents,44 to regulate its own proceedings, and to 
punish acts amounting to contempt of Parliament. Along with issues 
arising under freedom of speech, it is with those latter two powers that 
this paper is principally concerned and to which we now tum. 45 
III PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES AND THE COURT: AN 
UNRESOLVED TENSION 
A An Historical Ordeal with Contemporary Relevance 
At the heart of the lacuna in the law that leaves Parliament as 
the sole arbiter of the exercise of its punitive powers is the relationship 
between parliament and the courts. The common law and statutory 
bases for parliamentary privilege form the basis of an w1res0Ived 
tension between those two branches of govemment,46 variously 
characterized as modem day mutuality of respect, comity between the 
Courts and Parliament,47 and "a relationship of detente",48 each branch 
being reluctant to interfere in the other's proper spheres of activity. 
Understanding the precise nature of that unresolved tension is critical 
construction, freedom to regulate composition: see generally Limon and McKay, 
above n I, 65-8 I, I 00-107 and Law Commission, above n I, 9-25. On the 
privilege concerning the freedom to regulate composition see the detailed 
discussion in Report of the Privileges Committee on the Question of Privilege 
referred on 22 July 1997 relating to the Status of Manu A/amein Kopu as a 
Member of Parliament [2001] AJHR I 15 B . 
43 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 11. 
44 Campbell, above n I, 7. 
45 Other privileges issues that are not dealt with in this paper, incl uding waiver, 
judicial review of legislative processes (manner and forn1). See generally for 
legislative processes Westco Lagan Ltd v A-G [200 I] I NZLR 40 (HC) and Report 
of the Privileges Committee on the Question of Privilege referred on July 2000 
relating to Westco Lagan Ltd v A-G and the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives [2000] AJ HR I 17 A. 
46 Campbell, above n I, 7. 
47 Ah Chong v Legislative Assembly of Western Samoa [200 I] NZAR 4 I 8, (CA 
Western Samoa) Lord Cooke ofThorndon. 
4
~ Joseph, above n I, 393. 
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to understanding the reform issues that arise under Article 9 and the 
parliament's punitive jurisdiction. Eight cases concerning questions of 
jurisdiction to determine the existence, scope and application of 
privileges are relevant in this regard: Ashby v White, 49 Stockdale v 
Hansard,5° Case of Sheriff of Middlesex, 51 Bradlaugh v Gossett,52 
Fielding v Thomas, 53 and more latterly the comments in Prebble v 
TVNZ, 54 Awatere Huata v Prebble, 55 and Jennings v Buchanan. 56 
Ashby v White is the starting point for the Courts' assertion of 
jurisdiction in parliamentary matters.57 In a case involving a returning 
officer's conduct, the House of Lords held that it had jurisdiction to 
determine the nature of what does and does not constitute activities to 
which privilege attaches. Some 135 years later, in Stockdale v 
Hansard, it was determined that the law regulating parliament "was 
part of the law of the land and known to the courts of law which they 
could ascertain and declare".58 The practical result in Stockdale v 
Hansard, therefore, was that "[i]t enabled the court to decide the 
question of law, namely, the existence and scope of particular 
privileges, while it allowed Parliament freedom to detern1ine their 
manner of application". 59 The Case of Sheriff of Nliddlesex clarified 
the latter limb in holding that in the exercise of committal powers [a] 
49 Ashby v White ( I 703) 92 ER 126; 92 ER 710. 
50 Stockdale v Hansard, above n 3 I. 
51 Case of Sheriff of Middlesex ( 1840) I 13 ER 419. 
52 Bradlaugh v Gossett (1884) 12 QBD 271. 
53 Fielding v Thomas [ I 896] AC 600 (PC). 
54 Prebble v TVNZ, above n 33 (PC). 
55 Awatere Huata v Prebble (16 July 2004) CA34/04. 
56 Jennings v Buchanan [2004] UKPC 36 (PC). 
57 Joseph , above n I, 392. 
58 Joseph, above n I, 393. 
59 Campbell, above n I , 7; Joseph, above n I, 393-4. See also Prebble v TVNZ, 
above n 33, 6-7 (PC) Lord Browne-Wilkinson; Pickin v British Railways Board 
[ I 974] AC 765, 799 (H L) Lord Simon cited in Joseph , above n I, 393-4. The 
Australian position is the same: R v Richards; Ex parte Fitzpatrick and Browne 
(1955) 92 CLR 157, 162 (HCA) Dixon J appeal refused and High Court Judgment 
affirmed as unimpeachable in R v Richards; Ex parte Fitzpatrick and Browne 
( 1955) 92 CLR 17 l (PC) Simons V-C. 
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House must be taken to have "adjudicated with due regard for the laws 
and usages of Parliament". 60 
The Courts' assumption of jurisdiction in relation to the 
existence, nature and scope of a particular privilege is, from a rule of 
law perspective, entirely understandable. To hold otherwise, that is to 
leave those questions to Parliament itself, would be to invite an attack 
on the rule of law, leaving both Court and citizen at the whim of the 
House and its attendant political, rather than procedural, machinations. 
Bradlaugh v Gossett, however, showed a move away from the Courts' 
willingness to question conduct within the House. The basis for the 
decision does not fit neatly within the parameters established in 
Stockdale v Hansard. In Bradlaugh, the Stephen J held that matters 
concerning the internal workings of the House were matters for the 
House and not the Court. Therefore, the Court would not exercise 
jurisdiction, even if it may have held jurisdiction under the test in 
Stockdale. Joseph observes that Bradlaugh "defined the courts' self-
denying rule of jurisdiction", which meant that remedies for wrongs 
done persons in the House or in the course of the House's proceedings 
were to come from the House, not the comis. 61 
On the question of the exercise of punitive powers within 
parliament, Fielding v Thomas provides a clear example of the Courts' 
role in determining the enforcement of parliamentary privilege. In that 
case, the Privy Council explained that colonial legislatures did not 
have the inherent "power to punish the breach[es] of[its] privileges by 
imprisonment or committal for contempt without the express authority 
60 Joseph , above n 1, 394. 
61 In contrast, the High Court in Awatere Huata v Prebble (19 February 2004) HC 
AK CIV-2003-404-7014 Gendall J explained at para 28 that, contrary to 
Bradlaugh v Gassel!, " [m]embers including leaders of political pa11ies are 
members of Parliament, who are accountable to Parliament for what they do so far 
as regards the efficiency, policy and workings of Parliament and in that respect 
Parliament is the only Judge. But where they are acting pursuant to legislation they 
are responsible to a Court of justice for the lawfulness of what they do and of that 
the court is the only Judge". 
10 
from imperial legislation [which did possess such punitive powers]". 62 
Although New Zealand had in fact pre-empted the effect of this 
decision (and its antecedent)63 in 1865,64 the courts' role as 
determining the existence of parliamentary privilege are clear. 
In the fifteen years to 2004 the New Zealand judiciary has been 
asked to revisit the parameters of parliamentary privilege, most 
prominently in the area of defamation law and its interaction with 
Article 9. The Article 9 issues and wider questions of proceedings in 
parliament will be considered below, but in setting the scene for the 
6-
rest of the paper the cases of Prebble v TVNZ, ) Awatere Huata v 
Prebble, 66 and Jennings v Buchanan are instructive in articulating the 
modern tension between Parliament's and the Court's jurisdiction. 
In Prebble, the Browne-Wilkinson LJ reinforced the position in 
Stockdale v Hansard and Bradlaugh v Gossett that,67 
The Courts and Parliament are both astute to recognise their 
respective constitutional roles. So far as the Courts are concerned 
they will not allow any challenge to be made to what is said or 
done within the walls of Parliament in performance of its 
legislative functions and protection of its established privileges. 
Jennings v Buchanan affirmed those views, the Privy Council careful 
to emphasise that, 68 
[t is, again, an important principle that the legislature and the 
courts should not intrude into the spheres reserved to another. 
Thus if, as may happen, the absolute privilege of Parliament 
[under A1iicle 9] is abused, procedures exist [ ... ] to afford a 
62 Fielding v Thomas [ l 896] AC 600, 609 (PC) Lord Halisbury LC cited in Joseph, 
above n 1, 390. 
63 Kie/fey v Carson, above n 53. 
64 Privileges Act 1865. 
65 Prebble v TVNZ, above n 33. 
66 Awatere v Prebble, above n 55. 
67 Prebble v TVNZ, above n 33, 7 approved in Jennings v Buchanan, above n 56,. 
68 Jennings v Buchanan, above n 56, para 18 Lord Bingham (emphasis added). 
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remedy to a person [ ... ], and it is not the function of the court to 
provide one. 
Only slightly more recent, and certainly directly relevant to the 
jurisdiction question, is Awatere Huata v Prebble.69 Awatere Huata 
shares similarities with Bradlaugh v Gossett in that the case concerned 
the internal workings of Parliament, but it is complicated by the fact 
that the particular internal workings in question were regulated by 
statute. As Hammond J put it: 70 "[t]he problem in this case is acute: 
Parliament enacted a statute going to the heart of its own workings". 
In finding for the appellant, A watere Huata, the Court of 
Appeal identified that courts recognize the importance attendant on 
"ensuring the effective functioning of the legislative process [and that] 
the internal proceedings of the House of Representatives must be 
scrutinized and supervised by the House itself and not by the courts". 71 
But that limitation on the courts' jurisdiction did not prevent 
consideration of the existence and detennination of the scope of any 
privilege; deference would only arise where a privilege, once 
determined, revealed an exclusive jurisdiction in the House. 72 Nor 
does it prevent the court applying a statute in those circumstances.73 
However, the Court of Appeal went on to consider the scope of 
Bradlaugh v Gossett and identified that the court in Bradlaugh did not 
69 A,vatere v Prebble, above n 55. At the time of writing, this case was on appeal to 
the Supreme Court of New Zealand, however, it appears that the question as to 
whether or not the Courts are competent to inquire into statutorily regulated 
internal proceedings is not before the Supreme Cou1i: see Supreme Court Minute 
in Prebble v Awatere Huata (25 August 2004) SC CIV 9/2004 Gault and 
Blanchard JJ. Therefore, the Court of Appeal's judgme11t on this point appears to 
be authority in New Zealand. 
70 Awatere v Prebble, above n 5,, para 148 Hammond J. 
71 Awatere v Prebble, above 11 55, para 51 McGrath, Glazebrook and O'Rega11 JJ. 
72 Awatere v Prebble, above 11 55, para 51 McGrath, Glazebrook and O'Regan JJ. 
73 Awatere v Prebble, above n 55. Compare R v Graham-Campbell, ex p Herbert 
[ 1935] I KB 594 (EWCA). 
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state the internal proceedings rule 111 absolute tenns. The Court 
concluded that it,74 
Can and should consider and detern1ine the scope of [the relevant] 
privilege and thus the limits of the area that concerns the internal 
procedures of the House and is the subject of privilege. [The 
Court] will also determine rights touching on questions of 
privilege that are asserted outside and independent ly of the House. 
The passage is interesting in that the Court appeared to view privileged 
proceedings as a subset of a range of internal House proceedings, what 
might be coined the "narrow view" of proceedings (proceedings where 
the Comi ente1iains the possibility of jurisdiction) and the "wide view" 
(where the Court defers jurisdiction on the p1inciple articulated in 
Jennings v Buchanan,75 above). In combination with the fact that the 
relevant statute put internal decision making power in the hands of a 
body that is not ordinarily covered by privilege, 76 the Court found that 
it had jurisdiction to review non-privileged internal proceedings. 
The cases surveyed underlie the common position that there are 
some matters over which the House has exclusive cognizance. But 
what should also be clear is that the courts are competent to consider 
the nature and scope of the matters that make up the House's exclusive 
jurisdiction. For members, this is an aspect of parliamentary privilege 
74 Awatere v Prebble, above n 55, para 59 McGrath, Glazebrook and O'Regan JJ. 
75 Jennings v Buchanan, above n 56, para 18 Lord Bingham. 
76 Namely, the leader of the relevant political party. This, the Court of Appeal 
explained, was a case of admission of the Court's jurisdiction by implication, 
however, that view appears to go against authority in R v Graham-Campbell, ex 
parte Herbert [1935] I KB 594. R v Graham-Campbell concerned the issue of 
whether or not the Court had jurisdiction to consider the application of a liquor-
licensing statute within the precincts of the House . It was held that unless the 
relevant statute expressly admits the Court, the application of the statute is the sole 
domain of the House. Whilst R v Graham-Campbell was cited by the Court in 
Awatere Huata (at para 55), its implications , especially on the impo11ant issue of 
express admission of Court's jurisdiction, is not discussed. It is perhaps more 
surprising, therefore, that the issue is not on appeal to the Supreme Court: Prebble 
v Awatere Huata , above n 69, Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
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that raises cause for concern, as a Deputy Prime-Minister Dr Michael 
Cullen speech in the House implies: 77 
There is an increasing tendency to challenge the exercise of 
[Parliamentary] sovereignty. This comes not just from some 
radical Maori, who argue that sovereignty has never been legally 
acquired in New Zealand; it also comes from within the heart of 
New Zealand's judiciary. Our own Chief Justice has put the 
challenge ... where she has suggested [that] an untrammelled 
freedom of Parliament does not exist. 
There is interesting academic I iterature that can be used to back 
such a view-by no means all of it recent or of a radical bias-but 
it is not a view that I accept. In my view, we are approaching the 
point where Parliament may need to be more assertive in defence 
of its own sovereignty, not just for its own sake but also for the 
sake of good order and government. 
In considering parliamentary privilege reform options therefore it is 
important to be cognizant of the tension between the Courts' 
"definitional jurisdiction" and the House's "application jurisdiction". 
Parliament might well benefit from turning its collective mind to the 
question of whether codification would be to its advantage, given that 
the contours of privilege are shaped not by Parliament ( other than by 
statute), but by the Courts. 78 One thing is certain, "a system [ ... ] under 
which the [parliament does] not regard certain regulatory statutes as 
applying to [it], but voluntarily submit to their application, is hardly 
satisfactory". 79 
Before turning to the issues concerning matters from which the 
Courts are precluded, it is helpful to note that within the areas the 
Courts determine to be p1ivileged, a difficulty arises in obtaining a 
77 (24 May 2004) NZPD 13191-2. 
78 in what appears to be a striking irony, the Courts can never be in breach of 
Parliament's privileges so long as it holds the definitional wand. That the New 
Zealand House of Representatives has never considered this aspect of privilege to 
be of any concern is surprising. This is a matter traversed in VI D 2, below. 
79 Campbell, above n I, 188. 
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remedy for breaches of those privileges. Ashby v White and Paty 's 
Case illustrate the point starkly.8° Following the decision in Ashby 
that a vote was an enforceable "property" right at law as against a 
parliamentary returning officer, the plaintiffs in Paty 's Case brought 
an action against the returning officers for failing to accept their votes. 
The plaintiff's were held in contempt and the Court of Queens Bench 
denied it had the jurisdiction to investigate the return of writs. 
Although the issues at the centre of Paty 's Case are regulated by 
statute in New Zealand,81 the significant problem concerns how 
plaintiffs that have been wronged by the House obtain a remedy. If the 
Courts are unwilling or unable to exercise jurisdiction over a wrong so 
committed, that leaves the House as the sole arbiter of remedial 
justice. That result may be acceptable when a wider view is taken of 
the necessity of an uninhibited Parliament, and it is not necessarily the 
case that no remedy will be forthcoming, 82 but it is an issue that must 
be addressed in the refonn forn1ula when determining appropriate 
jurisdictional and procedural measures for meeting citizens' 
reasonable expectations of justice. 
B Article 9: Proceedings, Questioning, and Places Out of 
Parliament 
I Proceedings in Parliament 
The historical ordeal described above provides the backdrop to 
the interpretation of Article 9, in particular those elements concerning 
"proceedings in parliament" ( over which the court denies it has 
jurisdiction in most cases), 83 freedom of speech, 84 questioning or 
80 Paty 's Case, above n 32: facts summa,ised from Joseph, above n I, 393. 
81 Electoral Act 1993, Part 6. 
82 The decision to provide a remedy will lie with the House . 
83 But it does assert jurisdiction in assault cases: Bradlaugh v Gossett, above n 52, 
283 in Campbell, above n I, 11. For discussion on assaults in the New Zealand 
House, see Report of the Privileges Committee on the Question of Privilege 
ref erred on 12 March 1997 relating to the allegation that on Wednesday, 5 march 
1997, the Honourable Winston Peters assaulted the Honourable John Banks on 
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impeaching things said and done in parliament, and the places m 
which things said or done in parliament may not be questioned or 
impeached. The following discussion considers how Article 9 's 
interpretation raises legal problems that appear to be best resolved by 
recourse to carefully explicated codification. 
Beginning with proceedings in parliament, a core privilege is 
that "[p Jarliament is sovereign over its own business", 85 namely that 
business falling within proceedings over which it has not conferred 
jurisdiction in another body nor over which the court has asserted 
jurisdiction. That said, "there is no comprehensive definition of the 
term 'proceedings in Parliament', although it has often been 
recommended there should be". 86 An important issue, to the extent 
that the court's reticence in examining proceedings in parliament can 
leave affected persons without enforceable causes of action or 
remedies, is setting the parameters of what constitutes "proceedings" 
over which Parliament has exclusive cognizance. 
It has been suggested that the "mutual respect [the courts and 
Parliament afford each other in tenns of jmisdiction] is important, but 
there are still grey areas where the position of the boundary is unclear. 
One instance concerns the meaning of 'proceedings in Parliament' in 
Article 9 of the Bill of Rights". 87 Because "Article 9 confers absolute 
immunity against civil and criminal liability in respect of 'proceedings 
in Parliament', it is important for members and for the public to know 
what activities are covered by the phrase".88 The importance of the 
preceding observation cannot be overstated. A tenet of the law of state 
account of Mr bank's conduct in Parliament and thereby committed a contempt of 
the House [ 1997) AJ HR I 15 A. 
84 Considered separately in Part IV Article 9 and Freedom of Speech. 
85 J Griffith and Michael Ryle Parliament: Functions, Practice and Procedures 
(Sweet & Maxwell , Londres, 1989) p 88 in Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 
23. 
86 Joint Committee (UK), above n 1, para l 2. 
87 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 25. 
88 Joint Committee (UK); above n I, para 97. 
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and citizen is that there ought to be a remedy for a wrong. 89 If it is the 
case that strangers are unable to right the wrongs of things done to 
them by the House or its members in the course of proceedings in 
parliament, there is a strong case that strangers should know what the 
parameters of those proceedings are, along with expecting Parliament 
to provide some form of meaningful redress. Urgency for reform in 
this area is exacerbated by the fact that the courts, ruling case by case, 
cannot necessarily provide the clarity required of an informed public 
with expectations of certain individual rights as well as expectations of 
fair and responsible Parliamentary governance. 90 
The Joint Committee recommended that certain parliamentary 
"proceedings" do warrant the protection of absolute privilege,91 but 
certain proceedings do not. 92 Reinforced by the Article 9 's provision 
of "an altogether exceptional degree of protection [ ... ]",93 the Joint 
Committee concluded that "[i]n principle this exceptional protection 
should remain confined to the core activities of Parliament, unless a 
pressing need is shown for an extension",94 and that statutory 
expression was the only satisfactory answer.95 That conclusion is not 
89 Simpson v A-G (Baigent's Case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
9° For discussion on changing human rights expectations and the role that 
government plays in respect of those expectation see Jack Beatson and Stephen 
Grosz "The Impact of the Humans Rights Act on Private Law: A Knight 's Move" 
(2000) 116 LQR 380 and Lord Hoffmann " Human Rights and the Hou e of 
Lords" (1999) 62 MLR 159. 
91 Joint Committee (UK), above n I,: paras 113-1 14, "preparatory drafts and notes" 
and advice relating to parliamentary speeches; para 115, 118 "preparatory material 
[including research work] related to a member's participation in debate or in 
committee"; paras 119-123 "keeping the registers [of members interests] and 
hence the registers themselves" ( compare Rost v Edwards [ 1990] 2 QB 460); para 
126 strangers' complaints "taken up for investigation, [ ... ] partakes of the nature 
ofa parliamentary proceeding". 
92 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, : paras I 03-111 , 112, "communications betv,een 
members and ministers"; para 115, 118 "material [including research work] which 
has no direct connection with proceedings in Parliament is not protected"; para 
126 until strangers' complaints are "taken up for investigation, [they are not in] the 
nature ofa parliamentary proceeding". 
93 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 110. 
94 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 110. 
95 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 128-9. 
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alien to privilege reformers in New Zealand,96 and obviously not in 
Australia.97 
The Joint Committee recommended that "proceedings" should 
"[ c Jover[ s] debates in parliament, including motions, parliamentary 
questions and answers thereto .98 They [should] cover also the 
proceedings of parliamentary committees99 [and] the tabling of 
documents and petitions once presented to a house". 100 On the other 
hand, the Joint Committee explained that there was no basis for 
protection in relation to caucus meetings, 101 nor "[r]epublication or 
effective repetition by a member of what he or she has said in the 
course of Parliamentary debate". 102 The Joint Committee, however, 
expressed areas of doubt, in particular, "the status of members 
correspondence, [including] their correspondence with ministers", 103 
such as a letter by a member to a minister concerning the affairs of a 
statutory body is not a proceeding in parliament. 104 
An obvious problem, therefore, is the doubt surrounding what 
constitutes an absolutely privileged proceeding with the meaning of 
Article 9. International jurisdictions have codified or recommended 
codification of "proceedings in parliament" and it has to be said that 
such a time has come for New Zealand. That different High Courts 
have struggled to agree on this element of section 9 should serve as 
ample warning that not all is certain. 105 Codifying proceedings also 
96 Parliamentaiy Privileges Bill 1994, Explanatory Note Introduction , 4-5. 
97 Joint Select Committee (Cth), above n l. 
98 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para I 00; Campbell, above n I, 12. 
99 Campbell, above n I, 12. 
100 c ampbell ,aboven I, 12. 
101 Rata v A-G ( 1997) 10 PRNZ 304 (I-IC) overturned in Awatere v Prebble, above n 
55, para 64 McGrath, Glazebrook and O'Regan JJ; see also David McGee 
"Parliament and Caucus" [1997] NZLJ 137. 
102 Jennings v Buchanan, above n 56; Hyams v Peterson [ 199 l] 3 NZLR 648 (CA). 
103 Campbell, above n I, 12. 
104 591 I-IC Deb 334 (8 July 1958) refen·ed to in Joint Committee (UK), above n I, 
para I 05 in Campbell, above n I, 12. 
105 Solicitor-General v Smith [2004] 2 NZLR 570 (I-IC) and Rata v Attorney-General, 
above n IOI. 
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the advantages Parliament in that the House can agree on what it 
believes ought to be protected proceedings for the purposes of Article 
9 or its equivalent. 
2 "Impeaching" and "Questioning" 
(i) Impeaching, Questioning, and Crossing the Rubicon 106 
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines the modem 
meaning of "impeached" as "call[ing] into question the integrity or 
validity of (a practice)"; "charg[ing] with treason or another crime 
against the state". 107 The 17th century meaning includes "imped[ing], 
hinder[ing], prevent[ing]". 108 The Joint Committee concluded that 
"the meaning of 'impeach' is not clear: possible meanings include 
hinder, challenge and censure". 109 On the meaning of the word 
"questioned" in Article 9, James Allan has argued, in response to the 
decision in Prebble v Television New Zealand, that proving what is 
said in parliament as a matter of historical fact does involve a calling 
into question of what was said. 110 
The importance of the "questioning" and "impeaching" inquiry 
lies in establishing the bases upon which the House may find a breach 
of privilege or contempt of Parliament - acts done that fall within the 
Article 9 prohibition will prima facie give rise to breaches of privilege, 
upon which a claim for contempt may be established - as well as 
establishing the limits on what aspects of members' speech, debates, 
papers, and conduct may be examined and questioned in a comi of 
106 Bryan Horrigan in his article "Is the High Court Crossing the Rubicon? - A 
Framework for Balanced Debate ( 1995) 6 PLR 284, 291 describes the "Rubicon" 
in the title to this section as "[t]he dividing line between legislative and judicial 
law-making roles [which are] often more fuzzy than bright". 
101 Oxford Concise English Dictionary ( I O ed, OUP, Oxford, l 999) 711. 
108 0 'Chee v Rowley ( l 997) l 50 ALR l 999 in Campbell, above n l , 16 . 
109 Joint Committee (UK), above n l , para 36. 
110 James Allan "Parliamentary Privilege in New Zealand" (1996) 7 Cant ULR 324, 
327-8. Allan submitted that confirming the statement in the House is to extract 
information from that statement, which in tum meets the definition of questioning 
for the purposes of Article 9. 
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law. The following two examples illustrate how the courts have 
finessed the literal words of Article 9 so that it's jurisdiction to 
examine parliamentary proceedings, albeit in a restrictive sense, 11 1 1s 
maintained. 
(ii) Hansard as an Interpretative Aid in the Courts 
It is true that Article 9 "[r]estricts the uses which may be made 
m courts and other tribunals of evidence of parliamentary 
d . " I J? procee mgs , - however, that restriction 1s not absolute 
parliamentary proceedings may be employed as an interpretative aid. 
In the United Kingdom, the landmark case Pepper v Hart decided that 
"the purpose [ of considering Parliamentary debate about a bill (which 
is now a statute) is] to give effect to, not thwart, the intentions of 
Parliament". 11 3 That case reflected an already established practice in 
New Zealand courts of referring to parliamentary speeches to infonn 
h . . f A 11 4 t e courts mterpretat10n o an et. The Pepper v Hart rule is 
entirely justifiable on the basis that the courts are respecting 
parliament' s sovereign law-making authority and doing what is within 
its power to give effect to that sovereign intention. 
(iii) Reports and Critique of Speeches and Debates in the House 
"Article 9 has been held not to prohibit reception of evidence to 
prove no more than the occurrence of events in Parliament, including 
what has been said in the course of parliamentary proceedings". 11 5 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Prebble v TVNZ said 
that the limitations on questioning concerned only cases where it was 
sought to assert that "action[s] or words [in the House or proceedings] 
111 Campbell , above n 1, 88. 
11 2 Campbell, above n I, 88 . 
11 3 Pepper v Hart [1993] 1 All ER 1132, 1157 (HL) Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
114 Pepper v Hart, above n 113, Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
11 5 Prebble v TVNZ, above n 33, 10 (PC) Lord Brown-Wilkinson . 
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were inspired by improper motive or were untrue or misleading". 116 
Examination of statements otherwise from this purpose are not 
breaches of Article 9. 11 7 Prebble is troubling in that it "frustrates the 
search for truth in political matters and it also inhibits robust criticism 
of the conduct of those who have participated in parliamentary 
d
. ,, I 18 procee mgs . That is because parliamentarians may attack, from 
the floor of the House, any person that might wish to rigorously 
challenge members' actions. 
The consequence of the judgment in Prebble and its progeny is 
that cases concerning Article 9 issues, where "the purpose is to 
challenge the truth of statements made under parliamentary privilege, 
or to question the motives of the author of the statement, the evidence 
must be excluded". 119 Nor can a litigant adduce evidence of what was 
said in parliamentary proceedings to refute other evidence given in 
court. 120 But, "evidence of parliamentary proceedings to show the 
meaning of prior statements not protected by parliamentary privilege" 
116 Prebble v TVNZ [1995] I AC 321,337 (PC) Lord Browne-Wilkinson (alt cit) in 
Campbell, above n l , 88. Ariicle 9 "does not preclude reception by a court of 
what a member of parliament said in the course of a parliamentary proceedings 
when that evidence is adduced in solely for the purpose of showing the meaning of 
a later statement in which the member signified that he or she adhered to what had 
been said under parliamentary privilege": Campbell, above n l, 95, fn 38 citing 
Buchanan v Jennings [2002] 3 NZLR I45 (CA). See also Hyams v Peterson, 
above n 102; Cushing v Peters (No 3) [1996] DCR 322 (DC). 
117 Pepper v Hart, above n 113, 1156-7 Lord Browne-Wilkinson. Compare R v 
Secretary of State for Trade; ex pa rte Anderson v Strathclyde Pty Ltd [ 1983] 2 Al I 
ER 233 and Parliamentary Privileges Act I 987 (Cth), s I 6(3). The decisions in 
this area have not been consistent, turning to a large extent on the semantic 
nuances of what it means to "question" or "impeach". For such a nuanced 
discussion see Allan, above, n 11 O; An interesting aspect of the Prebble case is 
that the Privy Council's approach still requires the court to inquire into the 
motives behind the words or actions because in order to detem1ine whether the 
motives of a word or action is being questioned, you have to look at the meaning 
or motive of the statement's speaker to compare it to the reason for which the 
statement is adduced as evidence: Campbell, above n 1, 89. 
118 Campbel1,aboven I, 109. 
11 9 Campbell, above n l , 17. 
120 Prebble v TVNZ, above n 33; R v Murphy ( 1986) NSWLR 18, 34 (SC NSW) Hunt 
J in Campbe11, above n I , 91. This issue also affects access to things said in the 
House for the purpose of judiciall y reviewing Ministerial decision-making: Joint 
Committee (UK), above n I, 55, 59 . 
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is also pennissible under Article 9. 121 Fortunately, the Courts have 
dampened the damage that can arise from persons questioning or 
criticizing members, especially in cases where members have sought 
to sue strangers in defamation. 122 Where the substantive issue cannot 
be fully or fairly decided without reference to the excluded evidence in 
House proceedings, the court can (and should) order a stay of 
proceedings, 123 subject to the House's power to waive its privilege. 124 
3 Any Place Out of Parliament 
In Jennings v Buchanan the Privy Council reiterated the Joint 
Committee's assertion that 125 
To read the phrase [out not to be impeached or questioned in any 
court or place outside of Par I iament] as meaning I iteral ly anywhere 
outside Parliament would be absurd. It would prevent the public and 
the media from freely discussing and c1iticising proceedings in 
Parliament. That cannot be right, and this meaning has never been 
suggested. Freedom for the public and the media to discuss 
parliamentary proceedings outside Parliament is as essential to a 
healthy democracy as the freedom of members to discuss what they 
choose within Parliament. 
The Joint Committee and the Privy Council both recognized 
that the phrase "any ... place out of parliament" is a product of its time, 
where the principal concern was "to protect members of parliament 
against civil and criminal liabilities for things said in the course of 
121 Campbell, above n l, 95, footnote 38 citing Peters v Cushing [ l 999] NZAR 241 
(HC). 
122 Lange v Atkinson [1997] 2 NZLR 22 (HC) and Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 
385 (CA). 
123 Prebb!e v TVNZ, above 11 33 , 10 Lord Browne-Wilkinson; Enid Campbell 
"Parliamentary Privilege and the Admissibility of Evidence" ( 1999) 27 Flinders 
LR 367, 385. 
124 Campbell, above n 1, 121. 
125 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 91. 
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parliamentary debate", principally protection from the Crown and 
more latterly the courts . 126 
Having examined the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth), 
which prohibits courts and tribunals from questioning parliamentary 
proceedings, the Joint Committee recommended that "bodies whose 
proceedings are endowed with a degree of legal solemnity and 
fonnality" and who possess a statutory power to administer Oaths are 
bodies to which Article 9 applies. "Beyond such formal tiibunals", 
said the Committee, "Article 9 will not apply". 127 The Committee 
concluded that "[b ]y this means the boundary can be clearly 
delineated, with an embargo on examination of parliamentary 
proceedings in all courts and similar bodies but not elsewhere". 128 
However, it has been argued that such an approach or definition 
"fail[s] to take account of the fact that, under today' s conditions, the 
principle which informs Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 can be 
violated not only by extra-parliamentary bodies which have power to 
compel the giving of evidence, but also by bodies which do not 
possess such power but nevertheless have power to impose 
sanctions". 129 An approach to detennining what constitutes a place out 
of parliament is suggested below. 130 
C An Ordeal into the Future? 
Conflicts between Parliament and courts "has been avoided or 
managed by the exercise of discretion on both sides". 131 The courts' 
interpretation of what it means to "question" and to "impeach" has 
126 Campbell, above n I, 10; Clarrie Harders "Parliamentary Privilege - Parliament 
versus the Courts: Cross-Examination of Committee Witnesses" ( 1993) 67 ALJ 
109, 112-116. 
127 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 95. 
128 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 95. 
129 Campbell, above n I , 21. 
130 "An Ordeal into the Future" Part IIJ C, below. 
13 1 Geoffrey Lock "Parliamentary privilege and the Courts: the Avoidance of 
Conflict" (1985) PL 64. 
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shifted over time. That shift reflects a number of values, some of 
which are embodied in the common Jaw itself, others informed by such 
statutes as the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, especially section 
14. Parliament has also enacted statutes that limit the extent to which 
it can claim its proceedings have been called into question or 
impeached. This shift is a welcome one, but it does raise the issue, 
one that is a hallmark of the common law generally, 132 that the shifting 
sands of what constitutes prohibited questioning creates uncertainty in 
future cases as to what the Courts will or will not admit. 133 In that 
regard, codification can assist in communicating and clarifying the 
contours and parameters of prohibited questioning. That said it 1s 
equally important to be alive to the consequences of codification. 134 
Whilst the benefits from the courts' interpretation has shifted 
towards a more modern reflection of fair and proper governance, there 
is nothing to suggest that the courts wont stay their ground or even 
retreat from their position in the absence of codified refonn. Of 
course, there is evidence in New Zealand at least to suggest that the 
courts will not yield, 135 but nevertheless, it is certainly a latent concern 
in the absence of statutory clarity and articulation. Moreover, 
notwithstanding the courts' approach, it is fair to say that the meaning 
of "impeach" and "question" are in a state of development, 
"proceedings in parliament" similarly so. Recently overruled cases 
demonstrate the tenuousness of relying on the courts statements of 
what constitutes "any place out of parliament". 136 This latter issue is 
132 Geoffrey Palmer "The Iowa Sprung Gun Case: A Study in American Gothic" 
(1971) Iowa L Rev 1219, 1248. 
133 See Comments of Privileges Committee Chairperson Matt Robson in "Owen 
Jennings case prompts look at defamation" (24 September 2004) 
<http://stuff.co.nz/stuff/0,2 I 06,3044 l 46a6160,00.html> (last accessed 29 
September 2004). 
134 See below, Part ... for the Australian experience in this area under section 16(3). 
135 Sian Elias "Sovereignty in the 21 st century: Another spin on the merry-go-round" 
(2003) 14 PLR 148, 155, 162. 
136 Rata v A-G, above n IOI overruled Awatere v Prebb/e, above n 55, McGrath, 
Glazebrook and O'Regan JJ. 
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pertinent to the discussion of contempt, below, in the light of the 
House's punitive powers, which includes conduct that does "question" 
or "impeach" things said in the House. New Zealand does not have 
the same constitutional freedom of political speech that is embodied in 
the Australian Constitution, 137 although Lange v Atkinson and the 
Defamation Act 1992 provide some measure of protection. 138 
As regards Article 9, the courts have hitherto approached the 
provision as a parallel analysis of claim to jurisdiction and 
determination of claims that Article 9 precludes. As with the strict 
jurisdictional questions traversed in the previous section, the courts 
hold the brush that paints the contours of Parliament's claim to 
privilege under the Article 9, principally through the instrument of 
interpretation. 139 
The courts' approach to the determination of what amounts to 
legally relevant questioning under Article 9 has been a process of ever-
more increasing inroads into the absolute protection Article 9 has 
afforded and in particular speeches in the chamber; for some 
Members, this is an issue for concern. 14° For the purposes of receiving 
evidence, it is of obvious benefit to the court to be able to access and 
consider speeches in the House, as part of the statutory interpretation 
process or otherwise fighting Members' wanton defamation of 
strangers outside under House the illusion of an internal proceeding. It 
should be further noted that in seeking to clarify the parameters of 
Article 9, through legislation such as a new Privilege Act, the courts 
are not precluded from (nor should the be expected to be) drawing 
137 Campbell, above n l, 7, I I, 222. 
138 Defamation 1992, ss 16 and 18. 
139 Mangawaro Enterprises Limited v A-G [ 1994) 2 NZLR 451 (HC); See generally 
on the question of interpretative review Bulk Gas Users Group Ltd v A-G [ 1983) 
NZLR 129 (CA) and Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [ l 969) 
I All ER 208 (HL). 
140 Robson, above n 133. 
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guidance from the constitutional principles it currently employs. 141 
Indeed, the combination of constitutional principle as a guide to the 
interpretation of a Privilege Act will ensure the continued recognition 
that Parliament too is subject to the rule of law. 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 should not be 
forgotten in this connection. The courts have become adept at 
balancing wider constitutional and public interests against individual 
interests. So it would be with codification of privilege. Codification 
also has the advantage of enabling Parliament to put a stake in the sand 
as to what it views as proceedings and matter that should be off limits 
from the court. It is certainly capable to do so, and the Australian 
situation is an example of this. Section 16(3) of the Parliamentary 
Privilege Act 1987 (Cth) provides: 
In any proceedings in any court or tribunal , it is not lawful for 
evidence to be tendered or received, questions asked or statements, 
subm issions or comments made, concerning proceedings in 
Parliament, by way of, or for the purpose of 
(a) questioning or relying on the truth, intention or good faith of 
anything forming part of those proceedings in Parliament; 
(b) otherwise questioning or establishing the credibility, motive, 
intention or good faith of any person; or 
(c) drawing, or inviting the drawing of, inferences or conclusions 
wholly or partly from anything forming part of those proceedings in 
Parliament 
Section 16(3) sets the parameters of where New Zealand law is 
now. Indeed, the interpretation of section 16(3) in the Australian case 
Laurance v Katter 142 is very similar to the position reached in Jennings 
v Buchanan. 143 The fonner case concerned allusion to and 
confirmation outside the House of comments made in the House, 
141 Elias, above n 135 . 
142 Laurance v Kalter (1996) 141 ALR 446 (CA Qld). 
143 Jennings v Buchanan, above n 56. 
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without repeating the actual words in question. It was held that the 
statements in the House were admissible as evidence in an action 
against the Speaker for its confirmation outside the House. But as 
with the New Zealand position, the evidence must be tendered only 
from proving as a fact what was said in the House, and not to question 
the motives for its expression. 144 In any event, section 16(3) appears 
to be a sound solution to defining the parameters of what 
"questioning" or "impeaching" means in Article 9. 
On the question of what constitutes places out of parliament in 
which questioning or impeaching is precluded, it seems that combining 
the Joint Connnittee approach with that contained in its Australian 
critique is appropriate. That solution turns, though, on whether non-
parliamentary bodies, other than citizens or the media should question 
the veracity of things said in parliament. Given that the historical 
position under Article 9 had been to prevent the Crown using the 
courts to bring Members to account for things said in the parliament, it 
seems correct that the bodies in which questioning should be precluded 
be those bodies of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature and include those 
in which the compelling of evidence is necessary for detem1inations 
that question or in1peach the House and its members. 
IV ARTICLE 9 AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
A Freedom of Speech: A Constitutional Imperative? 
Article 9 provides: 
The freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in Parliament, 
ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of 
Parliament. 
144 Laurance v Kotter, above n 142, 447. See also NSW Branch of Australian 
Medical Association v Minister for Health and Community Services ( 1992) 26 
NSWLR 116. In Australia, some have argued that the decision in R v Murphy, 
above n 120, "achieves a better balance than that achieved by section 16(3)": 
Campbell, above n l, I 08. 
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Speeches conducted on the House's debating chamber or comment 
passed in the course of select committee proceedings are absolutely 
privileged - Article 9 confers on Members absolute immunity for 
things said or done in the course of parliamentary proceedings. 145 In 
addressing the importance of free speech in Parliament, the Joint 
Conunittee reproduced the House Commons Procedure Committee of 
Session finding that: 146 
We reiterate that the privilege of freedom of speech is an essential 
protection for members in carrying out their duties. There is no 
point in this privilege unless it provides guarantees against attempts 
from outside to control what members choose to say in the House . 
However, privilege carries with it responsibilities as well as rights; 
and those responsibilities have to be exercised within the rules laid 
down by the House and in conformity with the standards it expects 
of its members. Irresponsible or reckless use of privilege can cause 
great harm to outside individuals who enjoy no legal redress and, in 
some circumstances, could be prejudicial to the national interest. 
The strongest safeguard against so-called abuses is the se lf-
discipline of individual members. This means, for instance, that a 
member should take steps, before making a potentially damaging 
accusation against a named individual, to ensure not only that 
evidence exists but that it comes from a normally reliable source. 
This does not imply that a member needs to have evidence that 
would satisfy a court, but that he should act on the basis of 
something firmer than mere rumour or supposition. 
"[T]he constitutional principle [Article 9] encapsulates protect[s] 
members of [Parliament] from being subjected to any penalty, civil or 
criminal, in any court or tribunal for what they have said in the course 
of proceedings". 147 The histo1ical basis for the privilege was driven by 
parliament's need to be protected from the Crown. More latterly, 
145 Campbell, above n I, 51. 
146 House of Commons Procedure Committee of Session HC ( 1988-89) 290 in Joint 
Committee (UK), above n I, para 224. 
147 Campbell, above n I, 10; Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 37; Lock, above 
n 131. 
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although not exclusively so, 148 freedom of speech has been viewed as 
an important principle that goes wider than immunity from suit to a 
reflection of democratic values that may not have been readily 
apparent at the time of the Bill of Rights passing. 149 
Notwithstanding the free speech imperative, it should be borne 
in mind that Article 9 has been subject to a variety of qualifications. 150 
We have seen in the discussion in the previous Part of this paper that 
what comprises "proceedings" and what amounts to "impeachment" or 
"questioning" are vexed issues, although somewhat clarified in recent 
case law. Our concern now is with uncovering the nature of the 
relevant interests at stake under a law that permits absolute immunity 
for things said in Parliament, the governance regime around that 
immunity, and the rights of recourse for those suffe1ing the wrong end 
of a free speech salvo. 
In Prebble v TVNZ, Browne-Wilkinson LJ explained Article 9 
and the underlying interests at stake: 151 
[F]irst, the need to ensure that the legislature can exercise its 
powers freely on behalf of its electors, with access to all relevant 
information; second, the need to protect freedom of speech 
generally; third, the interests of justice in ensuring that all relevant 
evidence is available to the courts. Their Lordships are of the 
view that the law has been long settled that, of these three public 
interests, the first must prevail. But the other two public interests 
cannot be ignored. 
Although Prebble was a defamation case, the principle that the 
public interest in a free and uninhibited legislature is subject other 
148 Matthew Harris "Sharing the Privilege: Parliamentarians, Defamation, and Bills 
of Rights" Auck U LR 45, 47. 
149 Prebble v TVNZ, above n 33, 10-11 (PC) Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
150 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 37; Campbell, above n I, 11. 
151 Prebb/e v TVNZ, above n 33, 10-11 (PC) Lord Browne-Wilkinson, approved 
Jennings v Buchanan, above n 56, para I O Lord Bingham. For a detailed 
discussion of this Prebble v TVNZ, see Patricia Leopold "Free Speech in 
Parliament and the Courts" (I 995) LS 204. 
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important public interests is generally applicable and a helpful aid in 
interpreting Article 9. 152 To that end, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
ascribes Article 9 with underlying policy considerations, articulating 
certain defined interests that Article 9 contains, and locating those 
within a hierarchy of relative importance, rather than absolute 
importance. 
But that 1s not the whole answer, and detennining the 
parameters of what Article 9 proscribes requires an analysis of the 
important cases in which it has been squarely before the court. The 
courts' interpretation of Article 9 should serve as a guide for how a 
reform of that provision might progress, in the context of wider 
privilege reform. If it is concluded that the courts are making too 
large an inroads into parliamentary proceedings and questioning 
matters properly the domain of the legislature, then codified reform 
must look to push back the courts' assault. 
B Freedom of Speech as a Sword of Oppression 
Members may make statements that are "offensive or highly 
defamatory or unreasonably invasive" and without foundation. 153 In 
particular a speech delivered by the Honourable Winston Peters on 22 
March 1994 has served as a touchstone for commentators ' and 
members' concerns that the absolute immunity Article 9 affords to 
speech in the House is open to abuse. 154 Peters' was one example 
152 The public interest in an absolutely privileged freedom of speech in debate is not 
supported by everyone: Brett Walker "Has Lange Really Settled the Common 
Law?" ( 1997) 8 PLR 16, 21. 
153 Campbell , above n 1, 51. This is a matter about which concern has been 
expressed in Australia: Joint Select Committee (Cth) para 5.35. 
154 The Hon Winston Peters said in the course of debate that " in the past week we 
have witnessed the most telling example of political and big business corruption 
ever to rear its vile head in this country. l am talking about the activities of the 
European Pacific Group and people in positions of power to aid and abet 
international money-laundering criminals in a massive cover-up of crimes" 539 
NZPD 567 (22 March 1994) reproduced in Ha1Tis, above n 148. See also Palmer, 
above n 14 and Richard Best "Freedom of Speech in Parliament: Constitutional 
Safeguard or Sword of Oppression?" ( l 994) 24 VU WLR 91. 
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g1vmg nse to a wider concern "that individuals were increasingly 
being named in the House and attacked by MPs and there was no right 
of reply in respect of such attacks". 155 Peters has argued, however, 
that Article 9 affords a legitimate avenue for members to air concerns 
that have either been ignored or improperly dealt with in the other 
branches or government forums; in some cases naming is appropriate 
or necessary. 156 A decade later, Peters appears to maintain that 
view. 157 In Australia, untrue and unfounded, "'scurrilous', 'scandalous 
and shameful"' remarks have been made about strangers in the course 
of Parliamentary speeches and debate. 158 In the United Kingdom, 
misuse of privilege in the nature of highly offensive and defamatory 
statements about strangers is not novel. 159 
As things stand in New Zealand, there is sufficient justification 
for the freedom of speech in Parliament, 160 but the price that New 
Zealand's liberal democracy pays is the denial of an individual right to 
seek damages for harm to reputation as a result of words spoken in 
Parliament. 161 That price must be conditioned. A right to have one's 
side heard in a timely fashion and in response to the Member's speech 
is a fair compromise in the absence of damages. As the Joint 
Committee found, "there are occasions when members make 
observations on identified or identifiable people which may be unfairly 
critical or even defamatory". 162 Therefore, the difficulty is that no 
action may be maintained against such observations because "[t]hose 
impugned [ ... J cannot clear their names or obtain compensation [as] 
155 Palmer and Palmer, above n I, 176. 
156 Hon Winston Peters in Palmer, above n 14, 329-330. 
157 Hon Winston Peters (8 September 2004) PD 15463-15466. 
158 Campbell , above n 1, 51, 69. See also Enid Campbell " Investigating the Truth of 
Statements made in Parliament: The Australian Experience" [ 1998] PL 125; Joint 
Select Committee (Cth) para 5.35. 
159 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, paras 217-223. 
160 See generally Best, above n 154. 
161 Prebble v TVNZ, above n 33, I 0-1 I. 
162 Joint Committee (UK), above n 1, paras 218. 
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the legal immunity afforded by Article 9, [provides] no legal 
redress". 163 
It is important to remember also that statements may be made 
in the course of debate or in proceedings with Select Committees. 164 It 
seems somewhat unfair and unjustifiable that persons summoned 
before select committees against their will should be subject to 
ridicule, embarrassment and otherwise undignified treatment by select 
committee members. As such, the Australian Senate resolved to 
implement a reply procedure for strangers. 165 In the discussion below 
under "Regulating Freedom of Speech" the reply procedure is 
explored in more detail. In New Zealand, Standing Orders of the 
House of Representatives provide that non-members be offered an 
opportunity to table a response to the House if they are named in the 
debating chamber. 166 The opportunity to respond is not, however, in 
the nature of a right. An "application for response" provides that a 
stranger referred to in the House may make a submission within three 
months of the reference being made, 167 and only on the basis that the 
stranger has "been adversely affected by the reference or to have 
suffered damage to that person' s reputation as a result of the 
reference". 168 
Although the reply procedure does enable disaffected citizens 
some redress against members that detrimentally affect strangers' 
interests and libe1iies, that path of redress is limited and in some cases 
163 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, paras 218. 
164 Although not explicitly discussed in this paper, it should be noted that defamatory 
remarks may be made through strangers petitions to the House (Campbell , above n 
I, 53 ; Enid Campbell "Royal Commissions, Parliamentary Privilege and Cabinet 
Confidentiality" ( I 999) UWALR 24 I) or through Members' tabling of documents 
on behalf of strangers (Senate Committee of Privileges 72nd Report June 1998 (PP 
117/97) para 2.33). 
165 Senate Resolution 5 Cth PD Senate 17 March 1987, 798 in Campbell , above n I, 
70. 
166 so 160. 
167 so 160(2). 
168 SO 160(1)(a). 
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may not be realized - the Speaker has the sole decision-making power 
in respect of whether or not a reply should be incorporated in the 
Parliamentary record. 169 And that reply is unlikely to be read in the 
House. 170 
C Regulating Freedom of Speech 
"[T]here are clearly concerns about whether an appropriate 
balance has been achieved between promotion of freedom of speech 
within parliamentary forums and protection of countervailing public 
and individual interests". 1 71 In answering those concerns, the 
regulation of free speech in the House can be managed in the 
following ways. First, the absolute immunity Article 9 affords can be 
changed to a form of qualified privilege. Secondly, assuming that a 
change in status of free speech is unlikely, a codification of the basis 
upon which free speech jurisdiction may be exercise is possible. 
Thirdly, Standing Orders can be the sole repository of free speech 
regulation. Once the mechanics are established, the next question is 
what features the regulatory regime ought to contain. Accepting that 
Article 9 remains intact, the principal concerns reduce to whether or 
not a member should: provide advanced notification of an intention to 
name; provide the basis for allegations that could result in sanctions 
against the named individual; and provide a reply mechanism for 
persons suffering at the hands of a free speech salvo. Fortunately, 
changes effected by Standing Orders in 1995 and 2003 "[has] done 
much to reduce the risk of abuse of Parliament' s power against 
citizens". 172 But those refo1ms may not go far enough. 
It has been suggested that "[n]o fonn of redress can [ ... ] be 
provided to those who have suffered detriment by reason of statements 
169 so 161-163. 
170 so 163. 
171 Campbell, aboven I, 108. 
172 Palmer and Palmer, above n 1, 177. 
33 
made about them under parliamentary privilege unless parliaments are 
prepared to enact legislation which abridges [Members'] freedom of 
speech". 173 That suggestion may, however, approach the stick from 
the wrong end. 174 Because freedom of speech in parliament is of such 
significant constitutional importance, the better view is to ensure that 
citizens have an equal freedom in reply. The House also possesses the 
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate its internal proceedings. Attendant 
on that exclusive jurisdiction is the power to regulate members' 
speeches and actions in the House. It has been argued in Australia that 
the misuse issue exists because of the House's failure to adequate I y or 
even turn its mind frequently enough to sanction such misuse. 175 As 
the New Zealand House of representatives regulates the freedom of 
speech in debates and other proceedings by means of Standing Orders, 
a similar criticism can be levelled at its House's failure to manage 
"abuses". 
The reply procedure, which has met with some success in the 
Australian Senate and is provided for in Standing Orders, was rejected 
by the United Kingdom Joint Co1mnittee: 176 
The introduction in this country of such a novel fonn of 
par! iamentary procedure would suffer from the drawback of raising 
expectations that could not be fulfiJled. Simply to publish the text 
of any reply would mean that the trnth or falsity of the criticism 
would not be established. No financial redress would be 
forthcoming. The statement itself, even if published in Hansard, 
would not necessarily attract publicity matching the original 
comments. Moreover, as a matter of principle, statements by non-
members ought not, in any event, to have the benefit of the 
absolute privilege accorded to the official record of parliamentary 
proceedings. 
173 Campbell, above n 1, 85 (emphasis added). 
174 Ha1Tis, above n 148, 63-64. 
175 Campbell, above n 1, 67. 
176 Joint Committee (UK), above n 1, paras 220-221. 
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Whether or not the Joint Conunittee's criticisms are borne out 
in truth remains to be seen. It is submitted, nevertheless, that a reply 
system is better than nothing at all. 177 
There are a number of advantages m a reply procedure that 
mandates a tabling of a concise response in reply. Firstly, it is 
comparatively costless for all affected persons. Secondly, it is an 
alternative to imposing punitive measures on the Member speaking the 
words. The Australian Senate has argued that the process is worth 
pursuing. The Senate has said that: 178 
Given the small numbers of persons availing themselves of the right-of-
reply procedure, the question arises whether the procedure is worth 
pursuing. The committee continues to believe that the procedure is both 
desirable and successful. Indeed, the committee suggests that the right-of-
reply procedure may be applicable in forums other than the Parliament. In 
its dealings with persons who have perceived themselves to be adversely 
affected by comment made in the Senate, the committee has found in 
most cases that the persons have been concerned not with vengeance or 
apology, but rather to ensure that their voice is heard or views are put in the 
same forum as the original comments were made. 
A number of objections were raised by the Joint Committee in 
response, including claims that there is no contemporaneity in 
offending speech and its reply and therefore no relevance attaching to 
a reply tabled in the House. 179 It has been said that for those that fail 
to respond using the reply procedure it would be an admission of the 
truth of the Member's speech. 180 Additionally, the reply procedure 
would tend to give the appearance of passing judgment on Members, 
although the merit in this objection is difficult to find given that it is 
177 A good case can be made, in the light of the tendencies to use freedom of speech 
as an alternative court of inquiry, to have Standing Orders contain provisions of 
such punitive magnitude to ensure that members that make serious allegations 
without sufficient basis. The matter would be one for the Privileges Committee, 
which would determine whether or not the allegations had both any foundation 
and otherwise made in the public interest: Campbell, above n I, 67. 
178 Senate Committee, above n I para 3.20, 22. 
179 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 63. 
180 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 62 and 63. 
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the Member passing unsolicited judgment on the stranger. 181 A fourth 
argument against the reply procedure is based on the more spurious 
foundation that strangers "should not" get Members' absolute privilege 
and that in any event, strangers (like Members) can use non-House 
procedures. 
The Joint Committee's concerns about the reply procedure are 
unfounded. Notwithstanding how "[i]rresponsible or reckless use of 
privilege can cause great harm to outside individuals who enjoy no 
legal redress and, in some circumstances, could be prejudicial to the 
national interest [, t]he strongest safeguard against so-called abuses is 
the self-discipline of individual members", 182 those concerns miss the 
point that no remedy is due a clear and unjustifiable wrong. 
In contrast to the Joint Committee position, clause 8 of New 
Zealand's Parliamentary Privileges Bill 1994 on the other hand made 
the following provision: 
(!) No Member shall make an assertion in the House of 
impropriety, breach of duty, dishonesty, or criminal conduct on 
the part of a person who is not a Member, unless that Member 
has given written notice to the Speaker of the proposed 
asse11ion. 
(2) The Member shall not make the assertion in the House unless 
the Speaker has notified the Member that he or she is satisfied 
that grounds exist for making it. 
(3) It shall be a breach of privilege to make an assertion in breach 
of this section. 
(4) Where a matter of privilege under this section is referred to the 
Privileges Committee, the person in respect of whom the 
assertion was made shall be entitled to make submissions to the 
Committee. 
181 Joint Committee (UK), above n !, para 63. 
182 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 224. 
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Clause 8 imposes restrictions on unrestricted freedom of 
speech. 183 Secondly, the Speaker must assume a quasi-judicial role to 
assess the evidence that establish the "grounds" sufficient to support 
an assertion of impropriety. 184 Thirdly, it is argued that under clause 8 
the Speaker becomes Chief House censor, which is not an appropriate 
role for the Speaker in the context of free and frank parliamentary 
debate. 185 
Given that any form of regulation is a form of censorship on 
the subject-matter of debate, and given the constitutional importance 
of the debate and select committee processes, the bases upon which 
such censorship may be justified must be important. Moreover, the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act reinforces the magnitude of the 
justificatory censoring device. 186 A pragmatic approach, therefore, 
involves the recognition of two important values in a manner that 
obliges each side to concede the expression of those values. On the 
one hand there is Members freedom of speech, on the other is a 
citizen's enforceable right to respond to Members' allegations and 
assertions in the parliament. The rider here: would the right of reply 
encourage Members to name persons rather than prevent them? The 
trick will be to ensure that the House's time and energy will be 
affected by a reply procedure in a way that makes Members think 
seriously about naming. In addition, the fair balance view required of 
broadcasters and newspapers would need to be such that in any case 
183 Introduction to the Parliamentary Privileges Bill I 994, para l 7; Harris, above, 60. 
It should be noted that restrictions are not new and the question is one of degree 
and binding legal force. 
184 This criticism is not as strong as it first looks when it is borne in mind that 
existence of matters that result in breaches of privilege are first given life by the 
Speakers ruling that a matter of privilege stands referred to the Privileges 
Committee. Such a ruling is certainly in the nature of a quasi-judicial role. The 
same can be said of the criticism that a matter does have sufficient grounds. 
185 Harris, above n 148 , 6 I -62 
186 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. For recent judicial discussion on the 
importance of freedom of speech see Keith J in Hosking v Runting (25 March 
2004) CA IOI /03, paras 178- I 84. 
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where a stranger is named, the reply must be published in Hansard 
under absolute privilege. 187 
In conclusion, it must be accepted that Parliament will not 
abrogate its freedom of speech in debate or proceedings m 
parliament. 188 That reality is reflected in the following passage: 189 
We consider it a matter of the utmost importance that there should be 
a national public forum where all manner of persons, irrespective of 
their power or wealth, can be criticised. Members should not be 
exposed to the risk of being brought before the courts to defend what 
they said in Parliament. Abuse of parliamentary freedom of speech is 
a matter for internal self-regulation by Parliament, not a matter for 
investigation and regulation by the courts. 
Therefore, Article 9 must "remain on [New Zealand's] statute book or 
be replaced by more specific provisions". 190 That said disaffected 
citizens must have a right of reply where they are named in the House. 
The reply system may be awkward or difficult for the House to work 
around to ensure that a Member accepts responsibility for and 
accountability to the House in deciding to name a stranger. 
V PARLIAMENT'S PUNITIVE POWERS 
A Nature and Extent of the House's Punitive Powers 
The privilege of exclusive cognizance or jurisdiction 1s of 
"fundamental importance" 191 to the operation ofparliament: 192 
Acceptance by the executive and the courts of law that Parliament 
has the right to make its own rules, and has unquestioned authority 
over the procedures it employs as legislator, is of scarcely less 
importance than the right to freedom of speech. Both rights are 
essential elements in parliamentary independence. 
187 Defamation Act 1992, s 16 and 1 st Sch. 
188 Campbell, above n I, 26. 
189 Joint Committee (UK), above n 1, para 40. 
19° Campbell, above n I, 1 l. 
191 Joint Committee (UK), above n I , para 13. 
192 Joint Committee (UK), above n l , para 13. 
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To that end, parliaments exercise their primary punitive jurisdiction in 
relation to the application of its privileges: 193 
Parliament's right to regulate its own affairs includes the power to 
discipline its own members for misconduct and, further, power to 
punish anyone, whether a member or not, for behaviour interfering 
substantially with the proper conduct of parliamentary business. 
Such interference is known as contempt of Parliament. This falls 
within the penal jurisdiction exercised by each House to ensure it 
can carry out its constitutional functions properly and that its 
members and officers are not obstructed or impeded, for example by 
threats or bribes. 
The House maintains its power to punish for contempt through 
Standing Orders. 194 The House also has c01mnon law powers to 
imprison, which statute expressly preserves, 195 with those powers 
subject to the issue of a Speaker's warrant. 196 Whilst the origins of the 
power are obscure, 197 there is no doubt that the power to imprison 
exists. 198 The manner in which the House might go about drafting and 
executing the Speaker's warrant appears to be something in which the 
court has no concern. 199 
Although it has been observed that it "would probably be 
difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate that houses of parliament 
which lack penal powers [ ... ] have been less able to carry out their 
functions effectively than house which do possess such powers'',2°0 
ensuring that parliaments possess sufficient tools to ensure persons are 
193 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 14. 
194 so 92. 
195 Crimes Act 1961 , s 9(a). 
196 CrimesAct 1961 ,s3 15(1). 
197 Joseph, above n I, 427. 
198 Parliamentary Privileges Bill 1994, Explanatory Note, para I 0. 
199 What is particularly surprising, or even extraordinary, is the fact that the less 
particularised the Speaker 's warrant is, the less likely the court will be to 
intervene: R v Richard~; Ex parte Fitzpatrick and Browne, above n 59, 162 (HCA) 
Dixon CJ; Paty 's Case, above n 32; see generally Joseph, above n 1, 394-5. 
20° Campbel I, above n I, 195. 
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punished for interfering with its effective operation,20 1 or that a 
parliament has effective means to protect its privileges,202 remains the 
touchstone for whether or not punitive powers should be retained by 
the House. 203 
The New Zealand Parliament has no inherent power to 
imprison or fine, 204 although it has the power to enact laws that enable 
it to imprison or fine. 205 At present, the House's punitive power arises 
through section 242 of the Legislature Act 1908, which provides 
Parliament with all powers, privileges and immunities of the House of 
Commons as at 1865; that House has inherent punitive power.206 
There is some doubt as to whether or not the House possesses a power 
to fine, 207 but this has not stopped the House from doing so in fact. 208 
As a matter of logic it is not difficult to extrapolate a power to fine 
from the inherent powers of the House to whatever steps are necessary 
to ensure its effective functioning; and it is certainly the case that there 
is no express prohibition on the power to fine. 209 High on the agenda 
of refonn efforts has been the codification of the power to fine. 2 10 
Accepting, then, that the existence of punitive powers 1s 
justifiable, the real issue becomes the manner of their exercise. In 
201 Limon and McKay, above n I, I 08. 
202 New Zealand Law Commission, above n l , para 77 . 
203 Standing Orders of the House of Representatives ( I O February 2004), SO 394. 
204 Kie/fey v Carson , above n 63. 
205 Constitution Act l 986, s l 5. 
206 The punitive powers as they apply in New Zealand have include powers to: 
imprison; fine ; prosecute in the courts; suspend members; exclude from the House 
and its precincts; censure; expel; and to require an apology - New Zealand Law 
Commission, above n 1, para 80. 
207 See generally Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 272; Joseph , above n I, 437; 
New Zealand Law Commission, above n l , para 80. 
208 Parliamentary Privileges Bill 1994, Explanatory Note, para 10. See also David 
Wilson Questions of Privilege (Office of the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives, Wellington , 1999). 
209 Palmer and Palmer, above n l , 176. 
2 10 Standing Orders Committee Report on the Parliamentary Privilege Bill [ I 999] 
AJHR I I 8C 5; Standing Orders Committee, above n I. 
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1969 former Clerk of the House, Charles Littlejohn, concluded in his 
LLM thesis that, 21 1 
Though the House of Representatives has always shown itself to be 
ready to assert and defend its p1ivileges, it has almost invariably 
realised that the imposition of severe punishments would be 
followed by strong public reaction. One of the most frequently used 
warnings, given in the House by members almost throughout its 
history, has been that the House, being judge in its own cause, 
should take care not to impose and unjust punishment. Perhaps 
because this attitude has been held with constancy by the House, it 
has never restrained itself by making procedural rules to protect the 
rights of persons brought before it to answer to a charge of breach of 
privilege or contempt. The power, however, is still there, and there 
is no certainty that the House will not at some time punish some 
offender with severity and without due and just investigation. 
What makes the existence of Parliament's power to impose punitive 
sanctions difficult to accept is not so much the existence of the powers 
themselves, but rather the context that gives rise to their exercise and 
the adjudication procedures for their administration. Parliament's 
. . l . . ? 12 . d d d . h 2 13 pumt1ve powers, name y to 1mpnson, - repnman an a morns , 
and (for members) suspend Members' pay or attendance rights,214 arise 
in a wider variety of circumstances, not all of which are entirely clear 
or predictable. Punitive powers may arise in response to an otherwise 
unforeseeable contempt of Parliament, or in response to what might be 
thought to be legitimate political expression.
215 
211 Phillip Littlejohn Parliamentary Privilege in New Zealand (LLM Thesis, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 1969) 261. 
212 Joint Committee (UK), above n 1, para 271. 
213 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 272. 
214 Joint Committee (UK), above n 1, para 272. See generally Timothy Jones 
"Legislative Discretion and Freedom of Political Communication" ( I 995) 6 PL 
103. 
215 Unlike Australia, where the "implied constitutional freedom of political 
communication" restricts the federal parliament from imposing penalties, New 
Zealand strangers still face the possibility that the House may deploy its punitive 
powers in response to adverse or scandalous commentary about members or other 
parliamentary activity: see Enid Campbell "Contempt of Parliament and the 
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An uncertain and loose context, however, is not the only issue. 
Some may argue that the more important issue is the fact that the 
House is judge and jury in respect of its punitive powers, sitting in 
judgment over rules from which there is no right of appeal. When 
such a structure can be used to exert punitive power over strangers, let 
alone members, a legitimate question must be whether such functions 
are more properly and solely the domain of an impartial court.216 In 
the case of executive state power, the courts are arbiters of justice in 
ensuring that the state is using its power in accordance with the rule of 
law,217 namely the law as embodied in statute and common law. There 
should be no difference, therefore, when Parliament is asserting its 
powers or immunities - a court presiding over statutorily regulated 
conduct in Parliamentary proceedings is not foreign to New Zealand 's 
law_21s 
One final but nonetheless important issue is whether Parliament 
should have a power to imprison at all. Given that New Zealand 
courts operate under a complex statutory scheme for the administration 
and execution of orders leading to in1prisonment, 219 it is extraordinary 
that there remains a residual and loose power to imprison outside the 
judicial system. It is important, of course, to distinguish between 
temporary custodial powers, such as the police have, and custodial 
sentencing powers post-habeas corpus, whereas it may be appropriate 
for the Parliament to retain brief imprisonment power pre-habeas 
corpus; post-habeas corpus imprisonment powers must be the domain 
of the courts. 
Implied Freedom of Political Communication" (1999) 10 PLR 196 in Campbell , 
above n I , 7 and Palmer and Palmer, above n 1, 176. 
2 16 Palmer and Palmer, above n 1, 176. 
217 Ali v The Queen [ I 992] 2 WLR 357 (PC). 
218 Crimes Act sections 315; Electoral Act 1993; Electoral Integrity Act 1992. 
219 Crimes Act 1961 ; Criminal Justice Act 1985; Sentencing Act 2002. 
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B Arcane Privileges and Undefined Contempts 
"Houses may initiate inquiries to determine whether Article 9 
has been infringed and those with punitive powers may decide that 
offenders should be punished for contempt of Parliament" and its 
privileges,220 however, the range of activities that may come within 
privilege and the scope of the powers and immunities it provides are 
uncertain. 221 The Joint Committee has said that,222 
Much of the strength of parliamentary privilege, not least the extent 
to which it is widely recognised and accepted, lies in its antiquity; 
the same is true of its weaknesses, in particular the obscurity and 
obsolescence of certain areas of privilege. 
In response to an inherent suspicion attendant on antiquated rules the 
Australian parliament enacted section 4 of the Parliamentary 
Privileges Act 1987 (Cth), which provides that: 
Conduct (including the use of words) [ ... ] constitute[s] an offence 
[if] it amounts, or is intended or likely to amount to an improper 
interference with the free exercise by a house or committee of its 
authority or functions, or with the free perfonnance by a member 
of the member's duties as a member. 
In Australia, the threat of legal proceedings falls within section 4,223 as 
does the intended use of privileged materials in non-Parliament 
disciplinary proceedings. 224 
In New Zealand, Parliament has taken steps to remedy claims 
that contempt of Parliament Jacks sufficiently defined contours.225 In 
New Zealand, contempt of Parliament includes breaches of the 
22° Campbell, above n l, 21. 
221 Palmer and Palmer, above n I, 176. 
222 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 9. 
223 Senate Committee of Privileges 67'" Report (PP 141 /97) . 
224 Senate Committee of Privileges 72'"1 Report June 1998 (PP 117/97). 
225 In the Report of the Privileges Committee "Question of Privilege Referred on 24 
Februaty 1998 Relating to a Reflection on the Speaker" [ I 998] AJ HR I I 5 C, 3 
the Committee reflected on the claims that contempts were ill-defined and that the 
Parliament had taken positive steps to redress the lack of proscriptive boundaries. 
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House's privileges;226 contempt that has no source in breach of 
privilege or no precedent is termed a "constructive contempt".227 The 
categories of specific conduct that amounts to a contempt of 
Parliament are not closed,228 although the general principle is that it is 
"any conduct (including words) which improperly interferes, or is 
intended or likely improperly to interfere, with the performance by 
either House of its functions, or the perfonnance by a member or 
officer of the House of his duties as a member or officer".229 
Some attempt has been made in Standing Orders to outline 
rather than prescribe acts or omissions that give rise to contempt.230 
The range of contempts is diverse, including: specific contemptuous 
conduct includes those 21 listed in Standing Order 395;231 "abuse" 
contempts,232 being a reflection on the House or its members; media 
release contempts;233 leaked document contempts;234 and the topical 
226 Joseph, above n 1, 426. 
227 New Zealand Law Commission, above n I, para 78. 
228 Joseph, above n I, 427. 
229 SO 394. See generally Limon and McKay, above n I, I 08 in Joint Committee 
(UK), above n l , para 264. The Joint Committee at para 264 list 16 specific 
contempts arising from the conduct of strangers, and three member contempts. 
230 Standing Orders 396 and 397. 
23 1 Standing Order 395: (a) breaches of privilege; (b) deliberately misleading the 
House; (c) serving legal process in Parliamentary precincts without the Speaker's 
pem1ission; (d) removing parliamentary papers without permission; (e) falsifying 
the House's papers; (t) members' failure to declare their interests; (g) members ' 
receipt or solicitation of bribes; (h) accepting fees for business in relation to the 
House; (i) bribing members; (j) assaulting or threatening members in the conduct 
of House business; (k) obstructing Officers of the House from doing their duty; (1) 
reflecting on the character of conduct of the House or its members; (m) 
misconduct in the presence of a committee; (n) divulging the proceedings of a 
select committee contrary to Standing Orders; (o) publishing a false or misleading 
account of proceedings before the House or a committee; (p) failing to attend 
before the House or a committee after being ordered to do so; (q) failing to obey 
an order of the House or a summons issued by order of the House or by the 
Speaker; (r) intimidating, preventing or hindering a witness from giving evidence, 
or giving evidence in full, to the House or a committee; (s) refusing to answer a 
question as ordered by the House or a committee; (t) assaulting, threatening or 
disadvantaging a member on account of the member's conduct in Parliament: (u) 
assaulting, threatening or disadvantaging a person on account of evidence given by 
that person to the House or a committee. 
232 See below at p ... 
233 Report of the Privileges Committee on the Question of Privilege Relating to an 
Article Published in the Sunday Star-Times purporting to summarise the contents 
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obstruction contempt.235 These contempts are but a few of a vast 
range of contempts of parliament that Ultimately, the issue reduces to 
ensuring that those who might be subject to a contempt of parliament 
have sufficient advanced warning about what those might be. 
One of the great concerns with contempt of parliament, 
therefore, is the non-exclusive nature of conduct that can amount to 
contempt, with the attendant punitive consequences that flow from 
such conduct. That lack of clarity raises concern about the vagueness 
of the circumstances that has punitive consequences.236 One of the 
great principles of the criminal law in New Zealand is that conduct 
upon which the state's punitive powers may visited ought to be 
precisely defined and ascertainable in advance - contempt of 
of a draft report of the Maori Affairs Committee on its inquiry into the Crown 
Forestry Rental Trust [2003] AJHR I 17 D; Report of the Privileges Committee 
Three Questions of Privilege concerning the disclosure of select Committee 
Proceedings [2003] AJHR I 17 A. 
234 For example see Report of the Privileges Committee on the Question of Privilege 
referred on 14 August 200 I relating to the release of the report to the Education 
and Science Committee on its enquiry into the teaching of reading in New Zealand 
[2001] AJHR l 17 C and Report of the Privileges Committee on the Question of 
Privilege relating to an article published in the Sunday Start-Times purporting to 
summarise the contents of a draft report of the Maori Affairs Committee on its 
inquiry into the Crown Forestty Rental Trust [2003] AJ HR l l 7 D. Joint 
Committee (UK), above n I, para 267. 
235 The Speaker noted recently that "l nevertheless require that journalists act with 
consideration to everyone using the Parliament Buildings corridors, and, in 
particular, do not in any way impede the free access of members to the Chamber. 
In the latter regard, l wish to quote from Erskine May, 22nd edition, at page 121: 
"It is a contempt to molest a member ... while attending the House or coming to or 
going from it ... ". In our own Standing Orders-Standing Order 395(k)-it is 
specifically made a contempt to obstruct or molest a member. It is therefore 
necessary for me to re-emphasise the seriousness of obstructing a member in those 
circumstances": PD 7 April 2004 12431. 
236 The Legislature Act 1908, s 242 merely states that "The [New Zealand] House of 
Representatives ... and the Committees and members thereof ... shall hold, enjoy, 
and exercise such and the like privileges, immunities and powers as on the 1 s' day 
of January 1865 were held, enjoyed, and exercised by the House of Commons of 
Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland". Jeffrey Jowell observes that the 
principle for specific articulate of legality of action by government bodies "cannot 
be overridden by general and ambiguous words": "Beyond the Rule of Law: 
Towards Constitutional Judicial Review" (2000) PL 671 673. 
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parliament seems to run counter to those principles m many 
respects. 237 
One specific point might be made regarding "abusive 
contempts". The Joint Committee explained "abusive" contempts as 
those that "consist of words or actions by any person which [the] 
House considers disrespectful, insulting or defamatory".238 The 
Committee observed that the House of Commons had been inclined to 
treat any "affronts to its dignity, such as insults addressed to the House 
or members, and defamations of the House or the Speaker or 
individual members" as contempts.239 Like contempt of Court, there is 
nothing new in an institution of government protecting itself from 
wanton attacks on its dignity. 240 Nevertheless, the competing interest 
of citizens' ability to make free, frank and honest comment about its 
government is a hallmark of a strong and open democracy. 241 To that 
end, "[i]t may be noted that the Australian joint committee in 1984 
considered claims of contempt in this area should be abandoned, and 
sections 4 and 6 of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Australia) 
effectively abolished abusive contempt".242 Unsurprisingly, in the 
light of Australian resolve, the Joint Committee could243 
See no need to retain abusive contempt as a separate head of 
contempt of Parliament. If the abuse is so sustained or of such a 
degree that it amounts to an improper interference with the House or 
its members, then it constitutes a contempt anyway. Similarly, any 
237 Palmer, above n 14. 
238 Joint Committee (UK), above n l , para 268. 
239 Joint Committee (UK), above n 1, para 268 . 
24° Crimes Act 1961, s 40 l . 
24 1 Campbell , above n 1, 7, 11 , 222. 
242 Joint Committee (UK), above n 1, para 268. It is important to note that the 
Australian regulation of privilege, especially that concerning free political 
expression, turns on more than just the mere enactment of a Privileges Statue. The 
Federal Constitution of the Commonwealth impliedly limits the ability of State 
Parliament's ability to enact statutes regulating free political expression: Lange v 
ABC ( 1997) 189 CLR 520 (HCA); Nationwide News Pty Limited v Wills ( 1992) 
177 CLR I (HCA). 
243 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 268. 
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abuse which occurs in the course of and interrupts parliamentary 
proceedings constitutes a contempt. If there is no interference with 
Parliament's work, the abuse does not call for action from 
Par! iament". 
Sadly, the New Zealand Parliament has not always been so 
thick-skinned, even in comparatively modem times. Examples of 
circumstances giving rise to claims for abusive contempt have been: a 
member's allegations that the Speaker was biased against the member 
and their party;244 allegations that a member has lied to the House;245 a 
reflection alleging the poor conduct and character of Chair of 
Committees;246 and allegations that members have been involved in 
"unspecified but disreputable conduct".247 Of course there must be 
limits, and perhaps casting aspersions on the integrity of a member 
without sufficient or any evidence is to attack the dignity of the 
House.248 
C Natural Justice Issue 
1 Parliament, Citizens, and Fair Play 
The regulation of parliament's punitive powers suffers from a 
"lack of protection for the rights of strangers to Parliament who 
become emneshed in its proceedings",249 including "the fact that select 
conm1ittees [do] not appear to be obliged to follow the rules of natural 
244 Report of the Privileges Committee Question of Privilege Ref erred on 24 
February 1998 Relating to a Reflection on the Speaker [ 1998] AJ HR I 15 C. 
245 (1987-1990) AJHR l 15 E. 
246 (1987-1990) AJHR I 15. 
247 
( l 984-85) AJHR I 6 A. The "unspecified but disreputable conduct" in question 
concerned some innuendo that the members had been or were involved in bisexual 
or homosexual practices. In an amusing irony, the claim for contempt arose from 
the suggestion that the editor of the New Zealand Truth was attempting to 
influence members' votes by threatening to publish the relevant members ' 
identities. The irony ultimately resides in the fact that the House passed the 
Homosexual Law Reform Bill · legalising the so-called "unspecified but 
disreputable conduct". 
248 For example see Reports of the Privileges Committee, above n 244. 
249 Palmer and Palmer, above n I, 176. 
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justice when dealing with matters that could damage individuals".250 
In Ridge v Baldwin the House of Lords emphasised that natural justice 
is "something basic to our system [ of law]: the importance of 
upholding it transcends the significance of any particular case".251 
That view was approved and reinforced in R v Taito ,252 a New Zealand 
case concerning the rights associated with criminal appeal. The 
principle articulated in those two cases underlined the importance that 
the law attaches to ensuring that persons subject to the power of the 
state are able to access, in substance, procedural fairness in 
deliberations affecting their rights and freedoms. That said, Joseph 
makes a strong case that justifies a tribunal being a judge in its own 
cause: 253 there are common law exceptions to the rule against bias; and 
the courts sit in judge of their own in its contempt jurisdiction. There 
is nothing exceptionable in these "exceptions", however, the fact 
remains that the Parliament' s decisions are open to partisan influences, 
and are non-reviewable by another or higher tribunal. 
2 Section 27 
In New Zealand's liberal democracy procedural fairness is an 
important value. Ensuring procedural fairness becomes most acute in 
cases where the State is exerting power in relation to its citizens, either 
as individuals or as a class. Citizens ought to expect, therefore, that 
the State will confom1, in the exercise of its powers, to certain 
minimum standards of conduct and fairness. To that end, sub-section 
27of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 relevantly provides 
that:254 
Every person has the right to the observance of the principles of 
natural justice by any tribunal or other public authority which has 
250 Palmer and Palmer, above n I, 176. 
25 1 Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40, 114 (HL) Lord Manis. 
252 R v Taito [003] 3 NZLR 577, 600 (PC) Lord Steyn. 
253 Joseph, above n l , 434. 
254 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 27(1) (emphasis added). 
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the power to make a determination in respect of that person's 
rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognised by law. 
In addressing the role of section 27 in Parliamentary 
proceedings, Joseph observes that '"[the] lex parliamenti is an 
historical emanation which makes the House judge in its own cause, 
contrary to modern expectations of fairness and natural justice'". 255 
Section 27 is the progeny of Article 14 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), which provides:256 
[E]veryone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 
The press and the public may be excluded from all or part ofa trial 
[ ... ]when the interest of the[ ... ] parties so requires. 
Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his 
conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal 
according to law. 
Section 27 is drafted m wider terms than Article 14(5) as it 
concerns a "person's rights, obligations, or interests protected or 
255 Joseph, above n I, 386-7. Section 27 should also be read in combination with 
section 25(h), which provides that a person has " the right, if convicted of [an] 
offence, to appeal according to law to a higher court against the conviction or 
against the sentence or against both" . The availability of the procedural 
protections that fall within the auspices of section 25 of the Bill of Rights Act 
turns on whether the nature of Parliament's powers are civil regulatory sanctions 
or more in the nature of criminal sanctions. Section 9(a) of the Crimes Act 1961 
provides that no one shall be convicted of a common law offence however that 
section does not affect the power of the House to punish for contempt. But that 
does not mean that contempt of parliament, which includes a breach of its 
privileges (SO 395(a)) is a criminal offence for which section 25 of the Bill of 
Rights Act is available to guarantee minimum standards of justice. In Solicitor-
General v Smith, above n l 05, Wild and McKenzie JJ Full Court held that the 
defendant was in contempt of court for placing improper pressure on a litigant, 
interfering with the administration of justice, usurping the cou1i's role and 
undermining the public confidence in the Family Court (Crimes Act 1961 , s 
40 l (I), and (3)). In Parliament, on the advice of the Clerk of the House, the 
Speaker ruled that a finding of contempt of Cou1i was not a crime within the 
meaning of the Electoral Act 1993, s 55(l)(d) (PD April 6 12365). 
256 The importance of international covenants as aids in interpreting common law 
cannot be overlooked. In Hosking v Runting, above n l 86, Gault P (Blanchard J 
concurring) said at para 6 that "[t]he historical approach to the State's international 
obligations as having no part in the domestic law unless incorporated by statute is 
now considered as too rigid. To ignore international obligations would be to 
exclude a vital source of relevant guidance" . 
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recognised by law", not just matters relating to criminal sanctions. 
Therefore, affected citizens may invoke the protections in section 27 in 
any case concerning breach of privilege and contempt of Parliament. 
In addition to section 27, New Zealand, either directly through statute, 
or indirectly through international law, recognizes the importance of 
permitting persons affected by the state's punitive powers to have their 
case heard publicly before a fair and impartial tribunal.257 
The principal elements of natural justice may be characterised 
as comprising the right to right to be heard based on sufficient advance 
notice of a matter affecting person's rights, obligations, or interests 
protected or recognised by law;258 and to have the matter heard and 
determined by a "disinterested and unbiased" decision-maker. 259 At a 
very general level, the rights to notification and to be heard require 
that the decision-maker: gives notice of the impending decision;260 
discloses all relevant material upon which the decision is to be 
based, 261 including access to and cross-examination of witnesses; 
allowance for legal representation;262 and to ensure, as much as 
possible, that fair weight is given to the circumstances affecting a 
person subject to decision, natural justice provides that the decision-
maker is impartial and not interested in the outcome of the 
257 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 24 and 25; International Covenant on 
Civil and Political rights 1966, art 2, 4, and 26. 
258 "Audi alteram partem": Joseph, above n I, 848. 
259 "Nemo judex in causa sua": Joseph, above n l, 848. 
260 Joseph, above n l, 860. 
26 1 Joseph , above n l, 861. 
262 Joseph, above n I, 864. 
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proceedings, 263 and which has no inclination to predetermination. 264 
In other words, the decision-maker should not be biased.265 
One issue facing persons seeking to enforce the Bill of Rights 
Act is that the right under section 27 is subject to section 4, which 
provides that the Act cannot be used to invalidate another statute. Nor 
can the Bill of Rights Act impliedly repeal and earlier enactment by 
reason only of that enactment's inconsistency with the Bill of Rights 
Act.266 Nevertheless, through a range of interpretative techniques, the 
New Zealand courts have been able to achieve the ends articulate in 
the Bill of Rights Act notwithstanding section 4. 267 In addition, 
because the section 27 has been viewed as restating the common law's 
insistence on natural justice in the absence of express statutory 
provision to the contrary, the section 4 issue is not as significant as 
might first appear. Accepting that section 242 of the Legislature Act 
establishes that any parliamentary privilege is statutorily endorsed, the 
interpretation of that privilege must be read, under section 6 of the Bill 
of Rights Act, consistently with the provisions of that Act. Section 6 
263 Joseph, above n 1, 874. Whether a decision-maker is interested appears to lack 
definitional precision. At 877, Joseph cites R v Bow Street Metropolitan 
Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte Pinochet (No 2) [2000] I AC 119 (HL) for the 
proposition that any decision-maker found to have a relationship with parties to 
the case faces disqualification as adjudicator. 
264 Joseph, above n I , 885. 
265 Joseph, above n 1, 886 explaining exceptions to the rule against bias is necessity. 
That exception provides that where no decision-maker other than that who is 
apparently biased is competent to adjudicate, the "biased" decision-maker may 
hear the case. In a judicial review case concerning executive action it was held 
that "[t]here can be no doubt[ ... ] that Parliament can exclude any pa1ticular rule 
of natural justice by express words or by patent necessary imp! ication". 
266 R v Pora [2001] 2 NZLR 37 (CA); R v Poumako [2000] 2 NZLR 695 (CA). 
Compare the view that implied repeal falls in favour of human rights legislation: R 
v Secretary of State for Transport, exp Factortame Ltd [ 1990] 2 AC 85 (HL) and 
Re Winnipeg School Division (No 1) (1985) 21 DLR (4th) 1 (SCC) discussed in 
Andrew Butler " Implied Repeal, Parliamentary Sovereignty and Human Rights in 
New Zealand" (200 l) PL 586, 592-3. 
267 David Mullan "A Comparison of the Impact of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action" (2003) 1 NZIPL 115, 120; see also Janet McLean 
"Legislative Invalidation, Human Rights Protection and s 4 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act" [200 l] NZ Law Rev 42 l. 
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therefore enables section 27 of the Bill of Rights Act to guide the 
interpretation of Parliament's privilege to regulate its own 
proceedings. That argument requires, of course, that the courts be 
permitted (and willing) to evaluate a proceeding or parliament in the 
light of the Bill of Rights Act. In order to get that point, the Article 9 
hurdle must be overcome. That hurdle is all the more real in the light 
of Joseph's argument that "it would effect major constitutional change 
by a side wind for [the Bill of Rights Act] to deprive Parliament of its 
penal jurisdiction" because it is judge in its own cause.268 That 
consequence, however, need not be inevitable. The review jurisdiction 
of the Court need only go as far as is necessary to ensure adherence to 
fair and reasonable procedural safeguards, including the providing of 
reasons for privilege and contempt decisions. 
3 Natural Justice: an Evaluation of Regulation by Standing 
Order 
Do the House's procedures and codes of conduct withstand the 
scmtiny under a principled natural justice framework? The House's 
principal tool for ensuring natural justice principles are adhered to are 
Standing Orders of the House of Representatives. Standing Orders are 
the House's code of conduct and govern the members' conduct in the 
House as well as the conduct of strangers.269 The Standing Orders' 
coercive strength lies in the respect members have for the orderly 
functioning and dignity of the House as an institution. The Standing 
Orders may be amended or suspended in accordance with procedures 
contained within the Standing Orders themselves,270 and their 
interpretation is ultimately a question for the Speaker.27 1 Standing 
268 Joseph, above n I, 4 I 9, 433. See also Bradlaugh v Gossett, above n 52 (EWHC); 
Thomas v A-G (27 November 1995) HC WN CP289/95 Gallen J (HC). 
269 David McGee Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (2 ed, GP Publications, 
Wellington, 1994) 81. 
270 so 6. 
27 1 so 2. 
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Orders are the subject of ongoing review by the Standing Orders 
Committee.272 
The House is empowered to call for witnesses and papers on its 
own motion,273 either as a committee of the whole house,274 or through 
select committees.275 Where a committee does not have the power to 
call for persons or records within its field of inquiry, it may seek the 
Speaker's authorisation so to do. 276 These powers are not peculiar to 
Parliament and no issue, from a natural justice perspective, can be 
taken with the House's power in this regard. 
Standing Orders 199 and 200 are, however, difficult to 
reconcile with conceptions of natural justice and fair trial. At first 
glance, the preclusion against a committee 's inquiry into criminal 
conduct of a stranger is consistent with 21 st century conceptions of 
justice. However, Standing Order 199 provides that the House does 
have the power to order or allow a committee to inquire into such 
matters further. 277 Moreover, a committee is not prevented from 
"conducting inquiries and making findings, of a general nature into 
alleged criminal wrongdoing by" strangers.278 In contrast, members 
receive much stronger protection in that at the merest hint of 
wrongdoing, that member must be notified and the relevant committee 
may not pursue the matter without express warrant of the House. 279 
The distinction hardly seems fair as it places a Member in a better 
position to answer an accusation as the Member has advanced notice 
that strangers do not receive. 
272 so 7. 
273 so 195, 196. 
274 so 173-174. 
275 so 157, 184-5, 195-200. 
276 so 197. 
277 so 199(1). 
278 so 199(2). 
279 SO 200( I), and (2). 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
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The House's evidence rules also create a cause for concern, in 
particular those pertaining to "secret" and "private" evidence, as well 
as rules enabling conunittees to delete any evidence that is offensive or 
possibly defamatory, and "allegations evidence".280 Those evidence 
rules create a barrier to information that an accused can use to mount a 
defence. These issues are overcome to an extent by Standing Order 
235, which provides "access to information by person[s] whose 
reputation may be seriously damaged", as well as the rules restricting 
the use of "irrelevant or unjustified allegations"28 1 and ancillary 
procedures. 282 Procedural protections under Standing Order 228 go 
some way to ensuring that the interests of natural justice are being 
served. In this regard, ensuring that persons attending as witnesses at 
select committees are adequately informed and protect, as much as 
possible, from attacks by committee members . Standing Order 232 
provides that members who have been involved in accusing others, 
and in particular strangers, of misconduct cannot participate in any 
committee that is responsible for further inquiry into the conduct of the 
accused; similarly Standing Order 394 in contempt cases. Both 
Standing Order 228 and 232 remedy the possibility that the decision-
making power is exercised by an accuser. But it does not remedy the 
wider natural justice issue that the Parliament, through its other 
members, is a judge in its own cause and otherwise carrying out a 
function that is properly the domain of the courts who, at least in the 
case of strangers, have much more refined experience in fact finding, 
rules of evidence, and otherwise fair trial.283 
The Privileges Committee procedure 1s also of crucial 
importance to the reform debate, for the reasons hitherto discussed, but 
280 SO 219, "secret evidence"; SO 218, "private evidence"; SO 2 l 6 "offensive or 
possibly defamatory" evidence; and SO 234 "allegations evidence". 
28 1 so 236 . 
282 SO 237, and 238. 
283 Campbell , above n 1, 192. 
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also for the specific operation of that Committee. Matters of privilege 
may be raised with the Speaker in writing,284 before the next sitting of 
the House, 285 and in the case of matters of privilege arising from select 
committees, before the House next sits one day after the committee 
meets. 286 Allegations amounting to contempt or breach of privilege 
must be formulated clearly and precisely, for consideration by the 
Speaker.287 Any reference to the Privileges Committee is solely at the 
discretion of the Speaker,288 unless the matter is technical or trivial 
(although that status appears to be a question for the Speaker in any 
event). 289 The Speaker's ruling that privilege is in issue means that the 
matter stands referred to the Privileges Conunittee.290 One gap that 
remams 1s the Speaker has the absolute discretion to refer to the 
Privileges Committee, which a Member has identified creates 
uncertainty as to the grounds upon which a matter of privilege is 
referred. 29 1 
In conclusion, regulation by Standing Order is generally 
effective, and Standing Orders are followed. But courts cannot 
enforce Standing Orders to bring "rogue" Members to account.292 
Standing Orders do not expressly require a Member to apologise to an 
unjustifiably affected individual. The same is hue of partisan 
Privileges Committees deciding whether or not a person ought to be 
fined or imprisoned, or both. 293 The fact that the Speaker has the sole 
and unreviewable discretion to refer adds further hurdles to persons 
284 SO 387( I) . 
285 so 387(2). 
286 so 387(3) . 
287 so 388. 
288 SO 389( I) and (2). 
289 so 389(3). 
290 so 392. 
29 1 Hon Richard Prebble identified that the Speaker's basis for referring matters to 
the Privileges Committee seemed rather opaque: PD 12365 (6 April 2004) . 
292 "Rogue" is used in the sense that a member wantonly abuses the right of free 
speech, rather than to use the free speech privilege when other avenues have 
failed : see response of Hon Winston Peters in Palmer, abo ve n 14, 329-330. 
293 Enid Campbell , above n I, 159. 
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who are the subject of a claim of parliamentary contempt. It appears, 
therefore, that while Standing Orders containing natural justice 
provisions are a step m the right direction they also suffer from 
weakness in enforcement. 
D Contempt of Parliament and Punitive Powers: Principal 
Reform Measures 
The "penal nature of contempt of Parliament makes it 
particularly important that its scope should be clear and readily 
understandable by all".294 Contempts must be listed, constructive 
contempts eliminated, and include a draft clause that clearly states the 
basis for and circumstances upon which contempts arise. The laws that 
people are accused of breaching should be known in advance, clear, 
and accessible. Exacerbating the issue is that Parliament's decisions in 
relation to privilege, breaches, and contempt, are unreviewable in New 
Zealand courts. Natural justice, being principally infom1ed by the 
common law and reinforced by the Bill of Rights Act, establishes 
minimum standards of justice - but, again, those principles are not 
reviewable. In addition, Parliament, as sovereign and supreme law 
maker, posses the power to alter the nature and incidents of citizens ' 
rights. Those alterations in rights may be coercive or detrimental in 
consequence, but what ensures that such powers are lawful in 
themselves is the Parliament's adherence to procedural propriety; it is 
that procedural propriety that gives Parliament its legitimacy. 
"It is important, therefore, that the procedures followed in the 
investigation and adjudication of complaints should match 
contemporary standards of fairness".295 "While fairness is fundan1ental 
to any disciplinary procedure, the more serious the consequences, the 
more extensive must be the safeguards if the procedure is to be 
294 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 315 . 
295 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 280. 
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fair". 296 Consistent with the natural justice discussion and in the light 
New Zealand's commitment to the ICCPR, it is important that any 
reform ensure the following minimum safeguards: a right to be 
informed of the fact that one is accused of contempt of parliament, 
including any breaches, and the precise factual basis for the 
allegation;297 the opportunity to be heard in person;298 the ability to 
prepare a defence and to seek legal counsel, funded by the state in the 
same way as other legal aid is provided;299 the opportunity to present 
and to cross-examine witnesses as the accused feels is necessary;3°0 
and the preservation of a right against self-incrimination to the extent 
that such is allowable under the ordinary criminal law.301 And finally, 
decision-makers should not be persons implicated in bringing the 
accusations. 302 
On the question of punitive power, "[i]f the work of Parliament 
is to proceed without improper interference, there must ultimately be 
some sanction available against those who offend".303 Therefore, 
enabling the House to impose punitive sanctions is acceptable. That 
said Parliament does not need a power to imprison. Its abolition in the 
United Kingdom was recommended.304 It still remains in Australia, 
but it has been argued that it is not necessary other than as a temporary 
measure to deal with disorderly conduct in the gallery or select 
committee hearing. 305 Therefore, a limited power to fine 1s an 
296 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 280. 
297 ICCPR, Article 14(3)(a). 
298 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 281. 
299 ICCPR, A,ticle 14(3)(b)-(d). 
300 ICCPR, A,ticle 14(3)(e). 
301 ICCPR, A1ticle 14(3)(f), and (g). 
302 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 283. 
303 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 302. 
304 Joint Committee (UK), above n 1, para 302. 
305 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 306. See also Enid Campbell ... 
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appropriate reform,306 but the wholly draconian nature of 
imprisonment should solely be the domain of the courts.307 
In Australia, the changes effected by the Privileges Act (Cth) 
included:308 withdrawal of the power to punish for contempt for 
defamation (but otherwise retaining the common law power to punish 
for contempt;309 removal of the power to expel members ;310 and a 
rationalization of the scope and bases for which the Australian House 
could impose penalties.3 11 The measures comprising the Australian 
Parliament's punitive powers include the codification of powers to 
imprison and fine, 312 and it is clear that the Parliament's powers in 
relation to imprisonment may be exercised only in accordance with the 
Privileges Act (Cth).313 It is unclear that a similar approach is to be 
expected in the case of fines. 
Given that New Zealand ' s parliament should retain some 
punitive powers there remains one final but very impo1iant issue, 
namely the distinction between Members and strangers in cases where 
parliamentary sanctions are in issue. The Joint Committee resolved, as 
appears to be the appropriate course in other jurisdictions, to ensure 
that "contempt of Parliament by non-members should still attract [ ... ] 
punishment".314 It was said in addition that "[t]he underlying mischief 
of contempt of Parliament is the same in the case of members and non-
306 Joint Committee (UK), above n l , para 278. 
307 Joint Committee that the Commons reinforced that parliament retain " its powers 
of admonishment, suspension or expulsion , which are widely seen as essential for 
internal discipline": Joint Committee (UK) , above n I , para 276. 
308 Campbell,aboven I, 189. 
309 Parliamentary Privilege Act l 987 (Cth), s 6. 
310 Parliamentary Privilege Act 1987 (Cth), s 8. 
311 Parliamentary Privilege Act I 987 (Cth), s 7. 
312 Parliamentary Privilege Act 1987 (Cth), s 7. 
313 Parliamentary Privilege Act 1987 (Cth), s 7(3). 
3 14 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 30 I. 
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31-members". ) However, a strong case exists that Members should be 
punished by the House, strangers by the courts. 316 
Under Standing Orders, members are afforded the "privilege" 
of advanced notice of another member's intention to raise a matter of 
privilege affecting members of the House.317 There is no equivalent 
provision for strangers. A significant issue exists as to whether the 
House ought to retain what are effectively judicial powers of 
imprisonment and fine for the purpose of taking punitive measures 
against strangers. Members accept the House's powers to regulate its 
own proceedings and to punish Members for breaches of protocol as a 
condition of membership (as it is with professional associations), but 
to apply the same procedure in respect of non-members seems to run 
counter to modem expectations of faimess. 318 As the Joint Committee 
observed: 319 
Parliament is not a court of law. It is one thing for the House to 
discipline its own members. That can be regarded as primarily an 
internal matter, even though suspension of a Commons member has 
unhappy consequences for the member's constituents. It is altogether 
different for the House to impose punishment, potentially serious, 
on non-members. By becoming members of Parliament, members 
agree to abide by the rules of the House, including the rules relating 
to discipline; outsiders have agreed to nothing. 
The Joint Committee fmther noted that "[a] debate by the whole 
House, for instance, on whether to impose a fine on a non-member, 
and if so how much, is far removed from cu1Tent perceptions of the 
proper way to administer justice".320 
315 Joint Committee (UK), above n 1, para 274. 
316 Campbell, above n I, 6-7. 
317 SO 390 and 391. 
3 18 Joint Committee. 
319 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 305. 
320 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 306. 
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The obvious reform measure is to transfer strangers' alleged 
contempt of parliament to the High Court. evertheless, there is a 
caveat to such a measure. One of the hallmarks of contempt of 
parliament and breach of privilege is the Privileges Committee 
recommendation for no further action to be taken. The Privileges 
Committee possesses a discretion that is not well exercised by the 
court. If a Privilege Act were to hand jurisdiction for contempt of 
parliament over the courts entirely, the latter would be forced to 
impose a sanction or exercise discretion not to punish. Although the 
courts possess this discretion for other purposes, the factors that a 
court takes into account are likely to be very different from those that 
parliament, through the Privileges Committee, considers when 
deliberating over a decision to sanction. There is much to be said for 
parliament' s political flexibility in detennining the appropriate form of 
punishment in a given set of circumstances; a political flexibility that 
the courts do not have and do not want. 
In reconciling the need for partisan tribunals with political 
flexibility, one option is to leave parliament with a residual jurisdiction 
to exercise a power of referral to the High Court when it feels that is 
the appropriate course. There is the obvious disadvantage that any 
referral might prejudice the court towards a finding of contempt, but 
that need not be so. Courts operate under a presumption of innocence 
which the parliament, through the Attorney-General or Solicitor-
General, must overcome beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the 
mere fact of referral need not be presumptive of the outcome for an 
accused stranger. 
The preceding proposal differs slightly from that proposed by 
the Joint Committee, which recommended that "[fJor practical reasons 
Parliament's penal powers over non-members should, in general, be 
transferred to the High Court. Parliament should retain a residual 
60 
jurisdiction, including power to admonish a non-member who accepts 
he acted in contempt of Parliament".321 
VI OVERCOMING A LACK OF REFORM INCENTIVES AND 
WHY PARLIAMENT BENEFITS FROM CODIFYING 
PRIVILEGE 
A Overcoming A Lack of Reform Incentives 
Committees and sponsors have produced two draft bills,322 with 
proposed amendments to the relevant bills from two additional 
sources.323 For various reasons, each incorporating their share of 
merit, the bills have not progressed. The first significant refonn to 
parliamentary privilege after 1865 occurred in 1989. There the 
Standing Orders Committee recommended codification in the form of 
a new Legislature Bill. That reform, which was never enacted, 
proposed: 324 retention of section 242 of the Legislature Act 1908; 
enact the power to fine; abolish the power to expel members; and 
address certain mechanics in the operation of the proposed Legislature 
Bill. The Standing Orders Committee in 1999 turned its attention to 
the 1994 reform efforts contained in Hon David Caygill's private 
member's Parliamentary Privilege Bill. That Bill proposed a number 
of sweeping reforms, including: 325 abolishing the power to imprison 
and fine; defining contempt of Parliament; providing High Court 
jurisdiction to punish for contempt; providing a definition of 
"proceedings in Parliament"; and the introduction of a notification and 
reply procedure for comments that would detrimentally affect the 
32 1 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 324, sub para 3. 
322 Standing Orders Committee, above n I, 13 ; Parliamentary Privileges Bill 1994. 
323 Standing Orders Committee Report on the Parliamentary Privileges Bill [ 1999] 
AJHR I 18C; Auckland District Law Society, above n 37. 
324 As listed in the Summary Recommendations of the Standing Orders Committee, 
above n 1, 3. 
325 A useful summary of the principal reforms are discussed in Standing Orders 
Committee, above n 323, 4-7 and in New Zealand Law Commission, above n I, 
para 27-29. 
reputation of others. The Bill never got past the first reading. Not 
surprisingly, the Standing Orders Committee in 1999 believed that "a 
number of the more important aims of the Bill [were] addressed by 
procedural changes adopted by the House following its major 
procedural review carried out over 1995 and 1996".326 The Committee 
considered that amendments to the Standing Orders "satisfactorily 
resolved the most important objectives and uncertainties identified in 
the bill". 327 
As will be clear from the preceding discussion, reform has not 
been isolated to New Zealand. In the United Kingdom, The Joint 
Committee has aptly explained that "parliament should be [ ... ] 
vigorous in discarding rights and immunities not strictly necessary for 
its effective functioning in today's conditions."328 The United 
Kingdom position, it must be noted, is informed to a great extent by 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), where it has become clear that 
parliament cannot necessarily rely on its absolute privileges -
proceedings in Parliament are not beyond the reach of the European 
Court of Human Rights. 329 In Australia, key drivers for reform lay in 
addressing conflicting decisions in the New South Wales courts,330 so 
far as those judgments concerned "proceedings in parliament, 33 1 as 
326 Standing Orders Committee, above n 323, 4. 
327 Standing Orders Committee, above n 323, 4 . The Standing Orders Review 
underway at present provides a useful opportunity to consider whether or not the 
1999 Standing Orders Committee was correct in its assertion. 
328 Joint Committee (UK), above n l , para 4. 
329 The jurisprudence of that court has developed apace. In Demico!i v Malta (1992) 
14 EHRR 47 (ECHR) the Malta House of Representatives pursued a claim for 
breach of privilege against a journalist. The Court decided that the procedures 
adopted by the House of Representatives violated the journalist's right under the 
European Convention of Human Rights to have a fair hearing by an independent 
and impartial tribunal. 
330 Senate Committee of Privileges Parliamentary Privilege, Procedures and 
Practice in the Australian Senate 1966-2002: 10?1" Report (August 2002) 13. 
33 1 Egan v Willis ( 1998) 195 CLR 424 (NSW CA); Egan v Chadwick ( l 999) 46 
NSWLR 563 (NSW CA). 
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well as to implement the recommendations of the Australian Joint 
Select Committee on Parliamentary Privilege.332 
Working out the finer points of whether the courts or 
Parliament should bear the responsibility for presiding over disputes 
between Parliament and strangers remains a difficult question. "At the 
root of the conflict are two competing constitutional principles: on the 
one hand, the need for Parliament to be free from outside interference 
and, on the other, the right of every person to seek redress in the 
Courts".333 Nevertheless, the issues are clear. Firstly, Parliament 
either relinquishes some of its unilateral power of free speech or it 
provides an avenue of redress to innocent individuals of malicious 
verbal attacks. Secondly, Parliament must provide reviewable and 
enforceable procedures that meet minimum standards of justice, with 
the Parliament called to account, even if by declaration, in an 
impartial tribunal offering effect procedural safeguards. Thirdly, the 
fact remains that privilege is unprincipled, discretionary in its 
execution and is the wand that puts citizens at the mercy of legislators 
in a maimer that does not arise under legislation. Fourthly, the fact 
that the United Kingdom and Australia have seen a pressing need for 
refonn must send a strong message to the New Zealand parliament to 
similarly engage. 
Rule, accordingly law, requires certain standards of conduct by 
the governors. The governed have rights and legitimate expectations 
of fairness from their elected officials. That should be incentive 
enough - but it is not - New Zealand's recent reform efforts are 
testimony. That position must change. 
332 Joint Select Committee (Cth), above n I. 
333 The Laws of New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 2004) Origins of 
Parliamentary Privilege para 235 (last updated June 2004) 
<www.butterworthsonline.com>. 
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B The Codification Imperative and Why Parliament Benefits 
The New Zealand parliament benefits from codification m 
three main ways. Firstly, it comes into line with modem expectations 
of justice in accordance with international human rights law. In its 
contribution to the Parliamentary privilege reform debate, the 
Auckland District Law Society observed that, 334 
As the maker and giver of laws which are intended to operate as 
instruments of justice, Parliament simply cannot afford to allow its 
process to be used as an instrument of oppression. So to do would 
be to forfeit the legitimacy upon which Parliament's authority must 
ultimately rest. Parliament has, after all, committed itself to acting in 
accordance with the Bill of Rights Act [ I 990, section 3]. 
Secondly, it clarifies areas of uncertainty m the courts' 
interpretation of what amounts to a privilege as well as setting the 
parameters for justiciability. In the words of the Joint Committee: "[i]t 
is preferable for Parliament to declare now what is the scope of Article 
9, rather than risk having to change this constitutional provision in 
Parliament's favour after an unsatisfactory court decision". 335 
Codification, therefore, provides Parliament with an opportunity to 
clearly and definitively articulate its p1ivileges, powers and immunities 
to the body politic and to the courts. Parliament can overcome the lack 
of clarity surrounding "proceedings in Parliament" and what it means 
to "question or impeach". It would also enable the imposition of fines 
without the risk that a comt of law will deny the House's power to 
assert it punitive authority. More generally, the House will uncover 
for all to see one of the more mysterious and arcane pockets of 
jurisprndence known to the common law and to provide a coherent and 
accessible strncture to that jmisprudence. 
334 Auckland District Law Society, above n 37, 5. 
335 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 85. 
6-1-
It has been acknowledged that there are disadvantages to 
codification, although these may be matters of perception rather than 
substance. Firstly, codification invites the Courts' review 
jurisdiction.336 Secondly, there may be a constitutional crisis that 
follows the Court's intervention in matters of fact occurring in 
Parliamentary "proceedings". Thirdly, political factors will be unable 
to influence the outcome of cases coming before the court. Fourthly, 
undefined residual powers and privileges, which would be a necessary 
feature of an Act and are a feature of the Australian Privileges Act 
1987,337 as well as the proposed recommendations of the Joint 
Committee in the United Kingdom, 338 may result in reform in name 
only leaving the House with wide, impenetrable and unreviewable 
discretions. 339 Finally, essence of what makes codification an 
appropriate reform measure is best captured in the following note on 
the role of the common law as an infom1ant of the courts' self-denying 
jurisdiction and its incremental decision-making: 340 
To the extent that the common Jaw functions as a creator of social 
norms, the process of communication with the society whose norms 
they are supposed to represent often seem inadequate. The 
particularistic approach of the common Jaw makes communication 
difficult. This not to suggest that the common law ought not to 
decide hard cases. Rather it is a pleas not to burden the common 
Jaw with the weight of partisan decisions. The appropriate way to 
deal with [a] common law problem is by legislation, which would 
take the heat of the common law. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The Joint Committee resolved that "[t]here 1s merit [ ... ] in 
making the boundaries [ of parliamentary privilege] reasonably clear 
336 Awatere v Prebb/e, above n 55,. 
337 Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth), s 5. 
338 Joint Committee (UK), above n I, para 3 I 5. 
339 Standing Orders Committee, above n 19, 87. 
340 Palmer, above n 132, I 248. 
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before difficulties anse, [as ... ] people are increasingly vigorous m 
their efforts to obtain redress for perceived wrongs" .34 1 Following the 
Review of Standing Orders, a number of procedural safeguards were 
introduced to address "almost all the matters the [Parliamentary 
Privileges] Bill [1994] provided for". 342 Nevertheless, Standing Orders 
are not legally enforceable and as such Parliament's failure to adhere 
to any rules it makes are met with an empty remedy - a vote at the 
next election. Without a manifest right of redress or review, 
Parliament is both a law unto itself and accountable only to itself and 
the electorate every 3 years, but it is not accountable to individuals or 
the law. 
While reasonable people may disagree on whether or not a 
"right of reply' ' to accusations made in the debating chamber ought to 
be an additional reform in New Zealand, the recommendation that 
shifts the contempt jurisdiction in cases involving non-members is 
welcome, and ce1iainly overdue. Such a shift ensures that the alleged 
contemnor receives a fair trail from an unbiased tribunal. It can only 
be hoped that the implementation is not far way. 
Recent New Zealand cases are instructive m illustrating that 
Parliament would be required to set the parameters of what the courts 
could consider under a Privilege Act. Notwithstanding the courts' self-
imposed restraint in matters concerning the legislature, 343 the courts 
are not incompetent to judge the application of law to matters of fact. 
One problem of course is getting access to fact when it occurs in the 
context of a proceeding in parliament. The codification of privilege 
invites the possibility of court inquiry into matters that have hitherto 
been non-justiciable. It has been noted cases concerning the courts ' 
34 1 Joint Committee (UK), above n I , para 26 . 
342 New Zealand Law Commission, above n I, para I 08. 
343 See discussion above at Part III A "An Historical Ordeal with Contemporary 
Relevance". 
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jurisdiction when called on to apply statutes directly affecting 
Parliament that, 344 
Members including leaders of political parties are members of 
Parliament, who are accountable to Parliament for what they do so 
far as regards the efficiency, policy and workings of Parliament and 
in that respect Parliament is the only Judge. But where they are 
acting pursuant to legislation they are responsible to a Cou11 of 
justice for the lawfulness of what they do and of that the Court is the 
only Judge. 
The dictum illustrates that Parliament can and has provided the 
courts with avenues of review within specified parameters. A 
privilege Act should be no different. As has been recently observed, 
"nowadays the judges could be trusted to try cases of alleged contempt 
or parliament fairly and impartially and in accordance with all" 
procedural protections. 345 In a world of codified privilege, courts can 
and should be trusted and the House has the power to set the 
parameters. The time for refonn is now. 
344 Awatere Huata v Prebb/e (19 February 2004) HC WN CTV-2003-404-7014 para 
27-29 (HC) Judgment of the Court. Compare Raia v Attorney-General, above n 
IOI (subsequently overruled: Awatere v Prebble, above n 55, para 63 McGrath, 
Glazebrook and O'Regan JJ). 
345 Campbell, above n I, 192. 
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